Abstract
Attitudinal objects are entities of the sort we refer to as ‘judgments', ‘claims', ‘beliefs', ‘decisions', ‘desires', ‘fears', ‘intentions', ‘promises', and ‘requests'. This chapter defends the view that attitudinal objects form an ontological category of their own, distinct from that of events, states, and propositions. Attitudinal objects are concrete, agent-dependent entities that come with truth or satisfaction conditions as well as a part-whole structure strictly based on partial content. Attitudinal objects are extremely well-reflected in natural language and in our language-independent intuitions; they thus form part of the domain of descriptive metaphysics. The chapter presents the standard view of propositions and outline a compositional semantics for attitude reports with attitudinal objects in place of propositions.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
