‘Truth Predicates’ in Natural Language

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to take a closer look at the actual semantic behavior of what appear to be truth predicates in natural language and to re-assess the way they could motivate particular philosophical views. The paper will draw a distinction between two types of apparent truth predicates: type 1 truth predicates such as in English true and correct and type 2 truth predicates such as English is the case. It will establish the following points: 1. Type 1 truth predicates are true predicates, predicated of a representational objects of some sort, such as sentences, propositions, and entities of the sort of beliefs and assertions. 2. That-clauses with type 1 truth predicates do not act as referential terms, referring to propositions as truth bearers, but rather specify the content of contextually given attitudinal objects, such as ‘John’s belief that S’ or ‘Mary’s claim that S’. 3. Type 2 ‘truth predicates’ do not in fact act as truth predicates, but rather express the relation of truthmaking, relating a situation or ‘case’ to the content of a that-clause.