Attack resilient strategy for event-triggered distributed control scheme of multi-energy systems

Abstract

In recent years, distributed algorithms have been increasingly used to solve the economic dispatch (ED) problem of multi-energy systems (MES) due to the advantages of high flexibility, strong robustness, and privacy. However, the MES based on the distributed optimization architecture must bear higher cyber-attack risks, so as to maintain the safe and stable operation of MES. To address this issue, an event-triggered fully distributed algorithm is proposed to solve the ED problem, which can effectively mitigate the communication burden. On this basis, an attack resilient strategy against false data injection (FDI) attacks is implemented in the proposed fully distributed algorithm, which can eliminate incorrect measurement of incremental cost and power generation data caused by cyber-attacks. In addition, a reputation value protocol embedded in the proposed attack resilient strategy is designed to effectively reduce the potential of direct isolation of the node. Finally, case studies are given in this paper to validate the effectiveness of the proposed distributed control scheme on a 9-bus MES.