Athletic Identity and Moral Development : An examination of collegiate athletes and their moral foundations

This article draws from Charles Taylor’s work of retrieval to advance moral foundations theory (MFT). Taylor’s contribution to MFT lies in his insistence that we retrieve the moral sources that have helped constitute, substantiate, and give meaning to individuals’ moral sensibilities. Applying Taylor’s insights to MFT, this article seeks to advance a view of moral foundations that connects them more explicitly to their underlying moral sources. Using this retrieved account of moral foundations, this article then addresses current issues within moral foundations research and theory. Finally, this article suggests ways in which Taylor’s philosophy can contribute to three areas within business ethics: ethical leadership, behavioral ethics, and ethics pedagogy.

Morality is important for how humans treat each other and non-human animals. Differences in moral thinking have been found between autistic and neurotypical individuals. This research has relied on ways of thinking about moral psychology that suggest that mature morals develop as individuals learn to take the perspectives of others. Yet, even autistic individuals, who sometimes differ in their ability to take others' perspectives, make moral judgements that are similar to neurotypical individuals. Moral foundations theory suggests that moral psychology is not hierarchical but differs depending on culture. This theory could therefore help make sense of similarities and differences in autistic and neurotypical moral thinking. Moral foundations theory has not yet been investigated among autistic individuals. In this study, we interviewed autistic adults as a first attempt at understanding how moral foundations theory fits with autistic moral thinking. We found that all five moral foundations of moral foundations theory were represented in the interviews, yet certain foundations appeared more prominent than others. The autistic adults interviewed in our study discussed issues of care and fairness more than of loyalty, authority or purity when prompted to discuss moral transgressions. Future research should use quantitative methods to compare groups of autistic and neurotypical individuals to clarify similarities and differences in moral thinking between the groups.

The Development of a Moral Compass: Exploring Age and Gender Differences in Moral Foundations In Early and Mid-Adolescence.

Moral Foundations Theory proposes five universal moral domains—Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Purity—but its empirical support has largely been drawn from affluent, highly educated societies. This limits both the generalisability of the framework and our understanding of the socioecological factors that shape morality. To address this gap, we tested Moral Foundations Theory in three non-industrialised populations: Hadza hunter-gatherers, Datoga pastoralists, and Iraqw agropastoralists. We developed the Moral Foundations Boards, a novel pictorial tool designed to assess sensitivity to violations of the five moral foundations in low-literacy contexts. Participants completed the Moral Foundations Boards, while a sample from the United States served as a comparative reference and completed additional standard measures—the Moral Foundations Questionnaire and the Moral Foundations Vignettes. Although the five-factor structure of Moral Foundations Theory did not consistently emerge, we found cross-cultural variation. Hadza and Datoga participants showed greater sensitivity to Purity-related violations and reduced sensitivity to Care-related violations compared to participants from the United States. These findings challenge claims of structural universality in Moral Foundations Theory and underscore the importance of incorporating diverse socioecological contexts into the study of moral psychology.

Background: State-level public health messaging during the pre-election coronavirus pandemic was very inconsistent. Moral motivational content of the messages, as characterized by moral foundations theory, may have contributed to the degree of compliance in particular states. More attention to this content might result in greater compliance and a lessening of the pandemic's severity. Methods: A comprehensive review of official state messaging in six U.S. states (California, Florida, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, and Texas) was reviewed for the number and distribution of moral foundations as described by moral foundations theory. A search was done for state-level data concerning compliance with mask-wearing and social distancing, the primary public precautionary measures during the pandemic. Rates of compliance by the state were compared with messaging content and analyzed for associations and correlations with the known partisan leanings of the states. Examples of messages with balanced moral foundations, which might be prospectively employed for greater acceptance, were presented. All data were gathered prior to the introduction of the first available vaccine. Results: Message review and compliance data suggested that the quantity and proportion of coronavirus-related official messages and the utilization of a balanced combination of moral foundations were associated with higher levels of compliance with the recommended public health measures and lower infection rates. The political orientations of states did not align with the use of known conservative/liberal preferred moral foundations as previously established by Moral Foundations Theory. Conclusion: Adjusting messaging with attention to the balanced employment of moral foundations can lead to wider acceptance of and compliance with preventive public health measures.

Endorsement of the moral foundations specified by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) can sometimes fail to relate negatively to certain dispositions indicative of bad moral character. This evidence has fueled some concerns over whether the moral foundations in MFT are "moral." To increase understanding of how moral foundations relate to moral character, we proposed the "asymmetry hypothesis." This hypothesis states that "good" character is a more powerful predictor of each moral foundation than "bad" character. Put differently, there is an asymmetry in the strength (not merely direction) with which the moral foundations relate to encompassing indicators of good versus bad character. This is important because it suggests that links between the moral foundations and moral character will be somewhat concealed by focusing on bad character and/or not considering encompassing indicators of good character. A sample of college participants (N = 514) rated their endorsement of moral foundations and completed two sets of measures that represented encompassing indicators of both good and bad character. The data supported the asymmetry hypothesis: Each encompassing good-character assessment was a stronger predictor of each moral foundation than its corresponding encompassing bad-character assessment. Furthermore, variance unique to any good-character assessment had about moderate relations with each moral foundation, but variance unique to any bad-character assessment had no more than small relations with each moral foundation. The study provides a more nuanced understanding of how moral character relates to moral foundations and highlights utility in considering moral character as multidimensional.

Do one’s moral foundations impact how they respond to information on climate change emissions? A vehicle choice experiment

Moral foundations theory (MFT) holds that moral judgements are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral foundations but where and how these foundations are represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs remains an open question. Using a moral vignette judgement task (n = 64), we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral judgement of moral foundations, versus conventional norms, reliably recruits core areas implicated in theory of mind. Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each moral foundation elicits dissociable neural representations distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT, individuals' liberal or conservative orientation modulated neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm that each moral foundation recruits domain-general mechanisms of social cognition but also has a dissociable neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We discuss these findings in view of unified versus dissociable accounts of morality and their neurological support for MFT.

Originally developed to explain cultural variation in moral judgments, moral foundations theory (MFT) has become widely adopted as a theory of political ideology. MFT posits that political attitudes are rooted in instinctual evaluations generated by innate psychological modules evolved to solve social dilemmas. If this is correct, moral foundations must be relatively stable dispositional traits, changes in moral foundations should systematically predict consequent changes in political orientations, and, at least in part, moral foundations must be heritable. We test these hypotheses and find substantial variability in individual‐level moral foundations across time, and little evidence that these changes account for changes in political attitudes. We also find little evidence that moral foundations are heritable. These findings raise questions about the future of MFT as a theory of ideology.

This study delves into the intricate relationship between morality and episodic forgiveness (i.e. emotional and decisional), guided by moral foundations theory. Survey data were collected from 927 English-speaking Canadians, aged 18-57, using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, Decision to Forgive Scale, and Emotional Forgiveness Scale. Employing latent profile analysis, the research revealed three distinct moral foundation profiles-high moralists, individuators, and neutrals-each linked to different levels of decisional and emotional forgiveness. Further analysis using MANOVA and follow-up ANOVAs indicated that the high moralist group exhibited higher scores in both forgiveness dimensions compared to the individuator and neutral groups, whereas the individuator group reported higher emotional forgiveness than the neutrals. These findings illuminate the significance of moral development in forgiving and underscore the utility of moral profiling based on moral foundations theory in predicting episodic forgiveness.

Children's movies often provide messages about morally appropriate and inappropriate conduct. In two studies, we draw on Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) to derive predictions about actual depictions of morality, and people's preferences for different moral depictions, within children's movies. According to MFT, people's moral concerns include individualizing foundations of care and fairness and binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and sanctity. Prior work reveals that although there are political differences in the endorsement of these two broad categories-whereby stronger political conservatism predicts stronger binding concerns and weaker individualizing concerns-there nonetheless is broad agreement across political identity in the importance of individualizing concerns. We therefore predicted that heroes would value individualizing foundations more than villains, and that despite political differences in preferences for moral messages, there would be more agreement in the importance of messages promoting individualizing concerns. In Study 1, we coded heroes and villains from popular children's movies for their valuation of moral foundations. Heroes valued individualizing concerns more, and binding concerns less, than villains did. Participants in Study 2 considered moral dilemmas faced by children's movie characters, and rated their preferences for resolutions that promoted either individualizing or binding foundations. Although liberals preferred individualizing-promoting resolutions and conservatives preferred binding-promoting resolutions, there was stronger agreement across political identity in the importance of individualizing concerns. Despite political differences in moral preferences, popular depictions of children's movie characters and people's self-reported moral endorsement suggest a shared belief in the importance of the individualizing moral virtues of care and fairness. Movies are often infused with moral messages. From their exploration of overarching themes, their ascription of particular traits to heroic and villainous characters, and their resolution of pivotal moral dilemmas, movies provide viewers with depictions of morally virtuous (and morally suspect) behavior. Moral messaging in children's movies is of particular importance, since it is targeted at an audience for which morality is actively developing. What moral messages do filmmakers (and consumers, including parents) want children's movies to depict? Are these preferences related to people's political identity? And what are the actual moral depictions presented in movies? In the present two studies, we draw on an influential theory of moral judgment-Moral Foundations Theory-to develop and test predictions about the depiction of morality in children's movies.

The Moral Foundation Theory suggests five moral foundations that can capture the view of a user on a particular issue. It is widely used to identify sentence-level sentiment. In this paper, we study the Moral Foundation Theory in tweets by US politicians on two politically divisive issues - Gun Control and Immigration. We define the nuanced stance of politicians on these two topics by the grades given by related organizations to the politicians. First, we identify moral foundations in tweets from a huge corpus using deep relational learning. Then, qualitative and quantitative evaluations using the corpus show that there is a strong correlation between the moral foundation usage and the politicians’ nuanced stance on a particular topic. We also found substantial differences in moral foundation usage by different political parties when they address different entities. All of these results indicate the need for more intense research in this area.

Moral foundations theory proposes that individuals with conflicting political views base their behavior on different principles chosen from a small group of universal moral foundations. This study proposes using a set of widely accepted moral foundations (fairness, in-group loyalty, authority, and purity) as proxies to determine the degree of radicalization of online communities. A fifth principle, care, is generally surpassed by others that are higher in the radicalized groups’ moral hierarchy. Moreover, the presented data-driven methodological framework proposes an alternative way to measure whether a community complies with a certain moral principle or foundation: not evaluating its speech, but its behavior through the interactions of its individuals, establishing a bridge between the structural features of the interaction network and the intensity of communities’ radicalization regarding the considered moral foundations. Two foundations were assessed using the network’s structural characteristics: in-group loyalty measured by group-level modularity, and authority evaluated using group domination, for detecting potential hierarchical substructures within the network. By analyzing a set of Pareto-optimal groups regarding a multidimensional moral relevance scale, the most radicalized communities were identified among those considered extreme in some of their attitudes or views. An application of the proposed framework is illustrated using real-world datasets. The radicalized communities’ behavior exhibited increasing isolation, and their authorities and leaders showed growing domination over their audience. Differences were also detected between users’ behavior and speech, showing that individuals tended to share more “extreme” in-group content than they publish: extreme views get more likes on social media.

The article interconnects the research on welfare attitudes and welfare chauvinism with moral psychology in order to develop an interdisciplinary analytical approach designed for studying attitudes to welfare policies and potentially overcoming the divisions prevalent in many European democracies. It introduces Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) - an empirical approach to analysing intuitions, reasoning, and emotions constituting moral judgment - and outlines its understanding of competing versions of fairness and distributive justice. The potential contributions of MFT are exemplified on a case study situated in contemporary Slovakia which deals with two conflicting conceptions of fairness, as equity and as equality, embodied in the diverging attitudes towards an amendment to the Act on the Assistance in Material Need (2013). The article argues that MFT and related research programmes are irreplaceable components in an interdisciplinary study of the plurality of welfare policy attitudes. It also highlights the transformative potential of MFT and related research programmes in devising interventions aimed at changing (political) attitudes to welfare and reducing their polarisation.

Moral foundations theory (MFT), while inspiring much empirical work, has been the target of both methodological and theoretical criticism. One important criticism of MFT is that, in its attempt to explain variability in political ideology, it only repackages the core motives (resistance to change and opposition to equality) and does not actually provide additional explanatory potential. Indeed, some previous studies show that moral foundations do not explain variability in ideology beyond other relevant variables, and that the relation between moral foundations and political orientation is mediated by other ideological variables. In the present research, we examined whether moral foundations can explain variability beyond the core motives in samples from Turkey and the United States. Contrary to some previous findings, we found that moral foundations explain unique variance in general, social, and economic conservatism. These findings suggest that the moral foundations proposed by MFT cannot be reduced to other variables that have been used in the literature to measure ideological proclivities.