Abstract
Amsterdam Law Forum (ALF) is the student-run 'International Law Journal' of VU University. Every year ALF publishes a winter, spring, and summer issue. The journal consists of three sections; scientific articles, opinion articles, and commentaries. As of this year, ALF also creates a section for inaugural speeches. In addition, ALF hosts a conference in spring with a relevant legal theme, where renowned speakers are invited to share their perspectives. Overall, ALF is a topical journal that provides a platform for established scholars and young academics to share knowledge, opinions and experiences and to make contributions to the international law discourse. Staff, PhD students and master students who have written a very good thesis are invited to submit an article to ALF. What is learned in the cradle is carried to the tomb: we are looking forward to sharing your articles on our website!
Highlights
Has the United States Supreme Court coherently articulated a right to associate under the First Amendment? In the process of articulating that right, has it thought in a sophisticated and accurate manner about the nature of private biases and societal prejudice? Has it drawn a coherent line between private association and state action? Have modern liberal theorists fared any better in thinking about freedom of association? Does the ideal liberal citizen—an individual freely choosing among available associates—really exist? What is lost when we blur the line between public and private, or between ascriptive and chosen affiliations?
Careful thought about these questions leads directly to a paradox of liberal constitutionalism
Freedom of association includes the right not to associate, which is to say, to exclude; a regime of strong individual rights facilitates the creation of marginalized individuals and groups.[1]. If perpetually excluded, such groups seek social recognition, which liberal constitutionalism cannot grant, unless the state itself becomes complicit in discriminatory action.[2]
Summary
Has the United States Supreme Court coherently articulated a right to associate under the First Amendment? In the process of articulating that right, has it thought in a sophisticated and accurate manner about the nature of private biases and societal prejudice? Has it drawn a coherent line between private association and state action? Have modern liberal theorists fared any better in thinking about freedom of association? Does the ideal liberal citizen—an individual freely choosing among available associates—really exist? What is lost when we blur the line between public and private, or between ascriptive and chosen affiliations?Careful thought about these questions leads directly to a paradox of liberal constitutionalism.
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