Abstract

This paper examines the salient problems related to the separation of ownership and control of modern corporations, as discussed in the books The Wealth of Nations and The Modern Corporation and Private Property. It qualitatively analyzes past empirical studies and evaluates the effectiveness of various solutions aimed at alleviating the separation between ownership and control. The analysis reveals that the agency relationship between shareholders and organizational managers underpins the phenomenon of ownership and control separation in modern companies. This separation offers several benefits, including ensuring business sustainability through professional management, efficient decision-making, and maximizing physical capital. Additionally, numerous mechanisms have proven effective in managing these issues. The paper explores management ownership and incentives, independent ownership, and institutional ownership as solutions that they have been found to reduce institutional problems and manage risk avoidance.

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