Abstract

INCE ITS INCEPTION IN 1967, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has eschewed formal security collaboration under the auspices of the association as a whole. Formed during a period when American military retrenchment in Southeast Asia appeared imminent, ASEAN initially hoped to encourage external powers to follow a policy of selfabnegation toward the region-a goal articulated in the 1971 Kuala Lumpur declaration calling for the creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). In theory, ZOPFAN would facilitate the maintenance of external tranquility, while each ASEAN member would be responsible for its own domestic stability. To be sure, security cooperation was encouraged with respect to common problems, such as communist insurgencies which thrived along land frontiers, namely, MalaysiaThailand, Indonesia-East Malaysia. Nevertheless, limited joint military activity was undertaken outside the ASEAN framework without the direct participation of non-ASEAN states. This salutary arrangement was jolted with the formation of a SovietVietnamese alliance in 1978 and Hanoi's subsequent invasion of Cambodia. ZOPFAN was threatened in several ways: (1) Thailand was confronted by tens of thousands of Vietnamese regulars along its Cambodian border; (2) the Soviet Union became an alliance partner of the region's strongest military power; and (3) by backing the Khmer Rouge, China became associated with ASEAN's opposition to the Vietnam occupation-thus, for the first time, bringing the Sino-Soviet conflict directly into Southeast Asia. The 1980s has presented ASEAN with a new and more dangerous strategic environment. This article explores three important aspects of that environment: ASEAN's position in the new Southeast Asian great-power balance; the ASEAN states' potential for military cooperation; and the future of the Philippine bases. Unfortunately, space limits prohibit the analysis here of other issues important to ASEAN's future security, including the ssemingly interminable Cambodian war and future prospects of conflict over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

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