ASEAN’s Stakes: The South China Sea’s Challenge to Autonomy and Agency

If we had to choose one word to describe the relationship between China and the Southeast Asian states, it would be “asymmetric.” China’s population is 2.2 times the combined population of the ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).1 Its GDP is 4.3 times these countries’ combined GDP,2 while its 2017 military expenditure was almost 6 times the amount they spent collectively.3 Some scholars like to use the metaphor of Gulliver and the Lilliputians to compare China and the ASEAN states in world politics.4 The hope is that the Lilliputians can somehow tie up Gulliver if they work together. In the post–Cold War era, the ASEAN states successfully constrained China’s behavior through multilateral institutions, especially the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). After the 2008 global financial crisis, China’s assertive diplomacy in the South China Sea indeed caused some worries and suspicions in the region. However, the overall relationship between China and the ASEAN states has not fundamentally changed. Since 2013, China has continued its “charm offensive” to woo the ASEAN states with the proposal of the Maritime Silk Road—a massive infrastructure investment project that is part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On the one hand, Chinese investments, especially in the infrastructure sector, are largely welcomed in Southeast Asia despite some ups and downs, such as Malaysia’s [End Page 17] cancelation of two BRI-funded projects. The ASEAN states have, on the other hand, kept a nuanced and balanced attitude toward U.S. competition with China. I argue that a relationship of strategic interdependence has taken shape between China and the ASEAN states. Each side views the other as an indispensable actor in pursuing its strategic interests. Although the power asymmetry between China and the ASEAN states makes the latter more vulnerable than the former, the U.S. factor increases the sensitivity of China’s strategic dependence on ASEAN. Multilateral institutions have played a vital role in shaping Chinese-ASEAN relations. The more institutionalized relationship will empower both parties to reduce vulnerability and sensitivity levels in their nascent strategic interdependence in the future.

South China Sea Territorial Dispute: A Lesson for Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Introduction: Post-Cold War Globalization The end of Cold War, globalization of national economies, and Asian financial crisis were some of key factors that have established an ecologically conducive environment for India to enhance its linkages with Southeast Asian region. The demise of Soviet Union, India's main trading partner, and India's economic crisis of 1991 and subsequent economic reforms created a momentum for India to strengthen its trading links with Southeast Asia. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said that the Cold War moulds have been broken and this has enabled us to strengthen our links without ideological barrier. (1) India's engagement with Southeast Asia has spanned two millennia, based on trade, migration, language, culture, and religion.2 India has also been observing with concern that China's influence in Southeast Asia has grown. China's growing role in Southeast Asia contrasts with India's inability to strengthen its economic relations with countries of South Asia despite creation o f South Asia Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). (3) China's strategic links with Pakistan also irks India because of China's indirect interference in South Asia. This article will differ from previous works on India and ASEAN by focusing on India's relations with later entrants of regional grouping, namely, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam (CMLV). These newer ASEAN states are strategically very important to India because of their proximity not only to India but also to other Asian giant, China. In this context, article will also examine India's economic ties with Thailand, which has closer bilateral interests to CMLV states than other ASEAN member states. These five ASEAN members are also noted as riparian states of Mekong and are involved in framework of Mekong-Ganga Co-operation (MGC). The MGC ministers in Vientiane Declaration had identified several areas for co-operation; they include culture, education, tourism, transport, and communications. (4) India's focus on Thailand and CMLV states highlights fact that geographical proximity has a large influence in India's Look East policy because Southeast Asian states, in particular those along Mekong River, are also strategically important to China. When Myanmar became a member of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997, India came to share a 1,500-kilometre contiguous border with ASEAN. In this context, India's engagement with ASEAN states has assumed a different strategic perspective. At onset of India's 1991 economic reforms, engagement with ASEAN was to accelerate expansion and modernization of Indian infrastructure in form of communications, roads, ports, and power. (5) This meant attracting foreign investments and collaboration with more advanced ASEAN countries such as Malaysia and Singapore. Though still very important, engagement policy of India with ASEAN states has assumed an added strategic dimension in form of riparian stat es along Mekong River. From a regional perspective, Look East policy also demonstrated that India has little faith in development of its own South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation. According to Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha, the development of ASEAN, during last three decades, is only successful experiment in regionalism. (6) India believes that enhancing level of its economic partnership with ASEAN is an important part of its strategy to increase its share in world trade which stands at a mere 0.4 per cent at end of 2001. (7) The ASEAN region encompasses about 500 million people, with a combined total of US$737 billion in income and US$720 billion in external trade. India and ASEAN states are located in a geographically contiguous market that has 1.5 billion people with 300 million middle-class consumers in India alone. …

INCE ITS INCEPTION IN 1967, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has eschewed formal security collaboration under the auspices of the association as a whole. Formed during a period when American military retrenchment in Southeast Asia appeared imminent, ASEAN initially hoped to encourage external powers to follow a policy of selfabnegation toward the region-a goal articulated in the 1971 Kuala Lumpur declaration calling for the creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). In theory, ZOPFAN would facilitate the maintenance of external tranquility, while each ASEAN member would be responsible for its own domestic stability. To be sure, security cooperation was encouraged with respect to common problems, such as communist insurgencies which thrived along land frontiers, namely, MalaysiaThailand, Indonesia-East Malaysia. Nevertheless, limited joint military activity was undertaken outside the ASEAN framework without the direct participation of non-ASEAN states. This salutary arrangement was jolted with the formation of a SovietVietnamese alliance in 1978 and Hanoi's subsequent invasion of Cambodia. ZOPFAN was threatened in several ways: (1) Thailand was confronted by tens of thousands of Vietnamese regulars along its Cambodian border; (2) the Soviet Union became an alliance partner of the region's strongest military power; and (3) by backing the Khmer Rouge, China became associated with ASEAN's opposition to the Vietnam occupation-thus, for the first time, bringing the Sino-Soviet conflict directly into Southeast Asia. The 1980s has presented ASEAN with a new and more dangerous strategic environment. This article explores three important aspects of that environment: ASEAN's position in the new Southeast Asian great-power balance; the ASEAN states' potential for military cooperation; and the future of the Philippine bases. Unfortunately, space limits prohibit the analysis here of other issues important to ASEAN's future security, including the ssemingly interminable Cambodian war and future prospects of conflict over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

The Mekong Subregional Cooperation Framework:A Geopolitical Dilemma and the Ways Forward Charadine Pich (bio) In the current environment of regional security architecture dynamics, complex geopolitical dilemmas, and the congestion of subregional cooperation mechanisms, the Mekong is no longer just a river but also a core ground for competition in a broader context for power play among the major powers. Some observers have even highlighted that the issue of Mekong geopolitics could follow the trajectory of the South China Sea disputes in the near future if it is not taken seriously. For the riparian states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), successfully managing geopolitical contestation over the river and its resources is of critical importance. ASEAN and the Mekong: A Diverging Path? The Mekong River (known as the Lancang in China) begins in the Tibetan Plateau and passes through China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam before joining the South China Sea. The Mekong basin is one of the most biodiverse areas in the world, sustaining around sixty-six million people. This figure amounts to 10% of ASEAN's total population and includes "most of the population of Laos and Cambodia, one-third of Thailand's sixty-five million, and one-fifth of Vietnam's ninety million people."1 At stake in the river's management are issues such as water sharing, dams and hydroelectricity production, fisheries, irrigation, environmental conservation, and climate change mitigation. The ASEAN countries are mostly divided into two camps over issues pertaining to the river: mainland Southeast Asia and maritime Southeast Asia. States in the former put the Mekong River among their top priorities because of the river's importance to the livelihoods of their people as well as their vulnerability to changes in the water flow from upstream by virtue of residing in the Lower Mekong region. States in the latter group, on the other hand, do not have a share of the river and consider issues regarding [End Page 57] the Mekong not primarily as security concerns but more in terms of their technical and environmental aspects. The troubles over the Mekong River have been largely viewed through an environmental and socioeconomic lens and seen as affecting only the mainland countries of ASEAN rather than ASEAN as a whole. Hence, the river's linkages with the region's broader security and geopolitical considerations have been given less attention. In contrast, although not all ASEAN member states are claimants in the South China Sea disputes, this particular issue is largely considered a wider security dilemma in the broader region of Southeast Asia and beyond and a major threat to regional peace, security, and stability. Although it might not be entirely fair to compare Mekong geopolitics to those of the South China Sea, there is no better approach to understand the Mekong security dilemma than to look at it through that benchmark. The disputes have been widely regarded as an alarming security threat for all of Southeast Asia that could jeopardize regional peace and security if not cautiously monitored. This risk is due to the diverse military presence and, to a certain extent, the arms race surrounding the area. While the Mekong security dilemma has not yet warranted this same level of heightened concern, many regional analysts are cautious of unprecedented trends in the Mekong given the increasing involvement of external actors and development partners alike. The Mekong issue has not yet attained a regional status or posed "alarming" threats that encourage discussions at the regional level among all the ASEAN member states or priority placement on any existing ASEAN agenda. In fact, Vietnam tried to slot the Mekong agenda into the wider discourse within ASEAN platforms during its 2020 chairmanship but found "very limited success."2 In part, this omission was due to the Covid-19 outbreak, which disrupted traditional ASEAN practices and shifted regional attention to focus more on public health and economic recovery. Nonetheless, Vietnam's attempt to highlight the Mekong on the ASEAN agenda was met with reservations from both maritime and mainland members. The maritime ASEAN states see Mekong issues as only affecting the mainland states and thus believe they should be dealt with through existing frameworks at the...

South China Sea disputes has become intense in challenging regional stability in Southeast Asia. The strategic location of rich natural resources, for instance, oil and gas has triggered China and other Claimant States in Southeast Asia in exercising their capability mainly in military power to secure their claimed area. China stretched its “Nine-Dash Line” and created an artificial island namely Spartly Island. To date, this unresolved disputed questioning the role of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the leader of regional organisation in dealing with this conflict. The disputes mechanisms have been exercised by ASEAN, for instance, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) through ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as well as produced guidance in facing China through Declaration of Conduct (DOC) and Code of Conduct (COC). However, the progress apparently remain insignificant in achieving agreement. This paper examines ASEAN’s leadership in bridging the dispute through assessing the effectiveness of its dispute mechanisms through Confident Building Measures (CBM) as a diplomatic strategy in reaching one single voice in facing China.

Anumber of international and regional organizations, bodies, and forums are working on cybersecurity issues.1 Given that international cooperation is to some extent required to deal effectively with the cross-border nature of cyber-related threats, this article examines efforts in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region to counter these challenges. To date, national and regional efforts to adopt comprehensive cybersecurity strategies have been slow and fragmented. Similarly, the efforts of the ten ASEAN member states to adopt both national and comprehensive regional frameworks for cybersecurity have so far been piecemeal.2 Because governments and institutions will be required to foresee emerging trends and adapt quickly to new realities in order to preempt cyber incidents, this article envisages greater cooperation on cybersecurity among ASEAN and its members through the adoption of new structures and novel ways of thinking that complement national initiatives and international efforts. Further, regional cooperation efforts could encourage both collective security and the greater development of national cybersecurity measures.Cyber-related threats are creating increasingly serious risks for the global economy as well as for national and international security. The European Union (EU), for example, considers cyber threats as having the potential to reduce stability and competitiveness,3 while the U.S. intelligence community's worldwide threat assessment for 2013 ranks cyber threats first, ahead of terrorism, transnational organized crime, and the proliferation of WMDs.4 This marks the first time since September 11 that international terrorism does not rank first in the U.S. intelligence community's assessment of global threats to national security.5This article finds that the current lack of cohesiveness in ASEAN's approach to cybersecurity detracts from regional security and undermines the proper functioning of a single market. Given the body's goal to establish the ASEAN Community by 2015, cohesive efforts to comprehensively tackle cybersecurity issues are crucial and in the shared interests of ASEAN members. The article concludes that the digital divide between developed and developing countries need not delay regional cooperation; rather, it is essential for ASEAN to enhance its overall resilience to serious cyber-related threats and collectively tackle common global cybersecurity challenges. Doing so would complement ASEAN's ambitions to create a successful single market and production base, buttress connectivity, and strategically enhance the body's position in the evolving regional architecture. In addition, it would support both wider regional and international cooperation on cybersecurity.Although the ultimate objective of a comprehensive framework is a more resilient regional architecture for cybersecurity, given the limitations of ASEAN, the measures that are more likely to be attained in the shorter term are those that complement the aims of the ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.This article is organized as follows:* pp. 135-37 examine why ASEAN is significant in terms of global cybersecurity issues.* pp. 137-40 examine the increasing probability of cyber threats in Asia.* pp. 141-45 address the digital divide both between ASEAN members and between ASEAN and other states.* pp. 146-49 outline current official ASEAN documents and measures on cybersecurity.* pp. 149-55 offer several policy options for ASEAN to create a more robust regional cybersecurity regime.* The appendices provide non-exhaustive lists of cyber incidents in the ASEAN region since 2012, official ASEAN documents related to cybersecurity, and ASEAN national computer emergency response teams (CERT).WHY ASEAN IS IMPORTANT FOR GLOBAL CYBERSECURITYASEAN is a particularly significant region in terms of international cybersecurity issues. …

This chapter contributes to the ongoing debates regarding Cambodia's position on the South China Sea (SCS) dispute between China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimant states, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam. It talks about how Cambodia balances between ASEAN, the West, and China on the contentious issue of the SCS. It also mentions how China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea has put ASEAN states, other actors, and Cambodia in a challenging strategic situation. The chapter points out how the SCS is not of direct concern to Cambodia as it is a non-claimant state, but it still holds great relevance to the country as a member of ASEAN and as a nation that is a significant beneficiary of Chinese aid and investment. It assesses the foreign policy approach that Cambodia has pursued to align with China on the issue of the South China Sea, which presents both opportunities and challenges.

The role that peer pressure plays in efforts by member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in socializing a reluctant or recalcitrant member(s) toward a diplomatic posture or policy position has been noted but not systematically addressed in the existing literature. Given that the decision-making in ASEAN has traditionally been a consensus-based, political suasion is therefore the key modality through which ASEAN members develop shared perspectives and, where possible, ensure collective assent to an existing or emerging norm or position. Peer pressure is likely the only means available for ASEAN states to promote 'voluntary compliance' without contravening their institution's non-interference principle. Three historical developments are examined: Indonesia and the formation of ASEAN, the establishment of the ASEAN Charter,

The South China Sea region has been a site of conflict for decades, with numerous states holding competing territorial claims due to its abundance of resources and strategic importance. Recently, China’s construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea has escalated tensions in the region and has strained efforts to bring peace. This paper observes the role of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in resolving the conflict in the South China Sea. First, this paper studies the ASEAN-China code of conduct, the dispute management approach currently being negotiated between ASEAN and China. This code of conduct will govern the conduct of the countries involved in the South China Sea disputes. Furthermore, this paper proposes key provisions that should be incorporated into this code of conduct to make it more effective. Second, this paper reviews the conflicting views of ASEAN member states that impede the creation and adoption of the code of conduct. To conclude, this paper recommends an alternative solution through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), proposing that the conciliation procedure provided in UNCLOS be adopted to resolve the long standing South China Sea disputes.

The South China Sea has long been a source of regional tension, and disputes have heated up significantly in recent years. Disagreements over competing territorial sovereignty and maritime claims between Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam are the main source of this tension. Singapore, as a non-claimant country to the South China Sea disputes, does not take sides nor judge the merits of the rival claims. It has consistently urged parties to manage their differences calmly and peacefully in accordance with international law, including [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea].1Not being a claimant does not mean that Singapore has no interest in the South China Sea. Much to the contrary, as a small state, it has an interest in ensuring that all claimant states always act in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.2 Moreover, as an island state, Singapore has an interest in ensuring that international law preserves freedom of navigation and overflights and that such law is interpreted and applied consistently. Finally, as a Southeast Asian state, Singapore has an interest in ensuring that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains cohesive and united and that its processes effectively advance common interests by engendering a high degree of cooperation and integration among all member states. However, little progress has been made in negotiating a binding code of conduct (C°C) in the South China Sea since the adoption of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (D°C). Singapore, as the current country coordinator for ASEAN-China dialogue relations, hopes to make progress on that front.This essay examines Singapore's interests and role in the South China Sea in four areas: the commitment to upholding the rule of law in the relations between states, the defense of the right to freedom of navigation and overflight, the attention Singapore gives to ASEAN and the role of multilateralism in the region, and its current role as country coordinator of ASEAN-China dialogue relations.Rule of LawSingapore consistently has advocated for all parties to manage their differences calmly and peacefully in accordance with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. As a small country, Singapore has a fundamental interest in the peaceful settlement of international disputes in accordance with international law and its sanctioned processes rather than on the basis that might is right.3 Sovereignty disputes are governed by customary international law on the acquisition and loss of territory, not by the 1982 UNCLOS-a rather common misperception. Having presided over negotiations of the 1982 UNCLOS, Tommy Koh has iterated on various occasions that UNCLOS contains no provisions on how to resolve sovereignty disputes over islands or other geographic features. 4 The convention does set the various maritime zones that such features could potentially generate, defines the rights and obligations in those maritime zones, and in the event that there are overlapping maritime claims, determines how the maritime boundaries can be delimited in accordance with international law. Alas, claimant states in the South China Sea have taken unilateral actions in disputed areas, such as reclaiming and building artificial islands, conducting oil and gas exploration and exploitation, and increasing military and enforcement presence, all worrying trends.At this stage, where disputes are unlikely to be resolved by negotiation, Singapore advocates reliance on rules-based regimes and mechanisms to ensure peaceful settlement of the matter. Under no circumstances should force or the threat of force be used to settle disputes among states. Practical recommendations for managing the current level of tensions include a sweeping halt to all unilateral actions contrary to international law and for claimants to clarify the extent of the various claims. …

This chapter examines the recent developments in the South China Sea (SCS) by focusing on the actions taken by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the past few years to ensure the effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) and move toward the eventual conclusion of a regional code of conduct (COC) in the SCS. It discusses the adoption of the DOC, the difficulties ASEAN encountered in dealing with the SCS issues as a group, and recent actions taken by ASEAN in relation to the implementation of the DOC and adoption of a regional COC in the SCS. The chapter concludes with remarks on the prospect for implementation of the DOC and adoption of a regional COC, and a call for Taiwan's inclusion in the negotiating process that deals with the SCS issues and in particular the DOC and COC-related matters. Keywords: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); code of conduct (COC); Declaration on the Conduct (DOC); South China Sea (SCS); Taiwan

Introduction Throughout much of the post-Gold War period, the dynamics of the Sino-U.S. relationship have been a critical factor in Southeast Asian states' foreign policies. Southeast Asia has traditionally been a site of great power competition for regional dominance, due to its strategic location as a bridge between continental and maritime Asia. To manage this competition and to enhance their own subregional autonomy, the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) engaged in a number of regional institution building initiatives during the early 1990s. This institutionalist agenda led to speculation that ASEAN could become the hub of a nascent regional security community. (1) Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, however, the prospect that ASEAN could act as an autonomous entity to mitigate Sino-U.S. geopolitical pressures seemed increasingly tenuous. Weakened by political and economic instability, intra-regional disputes and a simultaneous expansion of its membership, ASEAN has come to question its own identity. This has only further undermined ASEAN-led regional security initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). More frequently, Southeast Asian states have favoured bilateralism and have looked to external powers to realize their security interests. (2) These changing subregional dynamics have, in turn, prompted renewed efforts by China and the United States to cultivate influence within Southeast Asia. China's attempts to gain support for its new security concept and US efforts to secure additional access and infrastructure agreements along the East Asian littoral are illustrative. To some extent, Sino-U.S. geopolitical competition has been modified by strategic cooperation resulting from the war on terror. Yet China still remains wary of U.S. attempts to engage Southeast Asia in countering global terrorism. (3) These trends have, in turn, compelled analysts to reconceptualize the Southeast Asian security landscape in a balance of power context. Principal among these exponents is Robert Ross. In his article Geography of Peace, Ross argues that as the two most geopolitically dominant regional actors, China and the United States preside over their own separate but complementary spheres of regional influence. He asserts that continental Southeast Asian states have aligned with China and maritime Southeast Asian states have aligned with the United States. (4) The geographic position of China and the United States, and the evolution of their interests and military capabilities accordingly, make it unlikely that either country would seek to project power into the other's respective sphere. Ross therefore postulates that the emerging bipolar structure is likely to be a stable and enduring one. This portrayal of Sino-U.S. relations has been acknowledged by recent literature on Asia-Pacific security. (5) However, Ross' depiction of how Southeast Asian states respond to this relationship has been subject much less to theoretical analysis. One contending school that has emerged argues that ASEAN states have adjusted to great power geopolitical competition by pursuing a strategy rather than by aligning with either China or the United States. Gaye Christofferson specifically seeks to refute Ross' argument by asserting that the Southeast Asian states maintain a position of equidistance between the great powers. She attributes this to the ASEAN states' general distrust of great powers and their desire to maintain the delicate Sino-U.S. regional balance. (6) In making this case, however, Christofferson fails to account for exactly how the Southeast Asian states overcome Sino-U.S. geopolitical pressures and under what conditions hedging prevails. These weaknesses are, to some extent, addressed by Avery Goldstein and Amitav Acharya. Both analysts place greater emphasis on the smaller Southeast Asian states maintaining closer external ties with one power while engaging the opposing power. …

Territorial claims in the South China Sea are one of the most longstanding security issues in South East Asia. In this article, former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo C. Severino reviews the claims of ASEAN members in the area, and details ASEAN's involvement in the dispute since the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. Amidst all the legal arguments and political and diplomatic posturing, the claimants to the land features and waters of the South China Sea—and others which have no claims—are really driven by their strategic interests in it. China fears the expanse of water being used to threaten or attack it from the southeast, as it has been in the past. At the same time, some accuse Beijing of seeking dominion over the South China Sea in order to achieve a measure of hegemony over Southeast Asia. Vietnam needs its footholds in the South China Sea to avoid being practically surrounded by Chinese power, with which it was in conflict for many centuries. The Philippines feels compelled to extend its zone of jurisdiction and responsibility westwards, having been invaded by the Japanese from that direction at the start of the Pacific War. A vast area of the South China Sea both separates West and East Malaysia and connects them to each other. Brunei Darussalam has to ensure for itself the resources in its claimed exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, which overlap with other claims. Others, which have no direct land or maritime claims in the area save those that they say are granted them by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), are keenly interested in what happens in the South China Sea. Jakarta needs to make sure that the rich gas resources of the Natuna group of islands are under Indonesia’s exclusive authority and for its exclusive exploitation. Although supporting no one’s claims, the United States seeks to ensure that its warships and aircraft are free to navigate in or above the waters of the South China Sea and keep unhampered its trading links with East Asia. Much of Japan’s trade flows through the South China Sea, including a large portion of its energy imports. Tokyo, therefore, has an interest in keeping the trading lanes through—and above—the South China Sea free and open. All, including the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have a deep interest in the peace and stability of the South China Sea. How much peace and stability figure in each country’s calculation of its

Raising the Stakes:The Interests of Non-claimant States in the South China Sea Disputes Tiffany Ma (bio) and Michael Wills (bio) The geopolitical game playing out in the South China Sea is becoming more complicated. China’s increasingly provocative actions are forcing regional players—from near and far—to make clear their interests and positions on the ongoing territorial disputes. In December 2015, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet issued a tough warning against China’s attempt to establish “so-called military zones” around its artificial islands and criticized its unilateral assertiveness as unacceptable.1 Although a non-claimant, the United States, given its role as a regional security guarantor, has long been an important stakeholder in the management and settlement of the disputes. However, China’s recent escalatory actions and behavior are leading more regional players to engage directly on South China Sea issues, both in the diplomatic arena and in the contested waters. Going forward, these non-claimant parties will likely play a greater role in influencing events in the South China Sea. This Asia Policy roundtable provides a timely survey of regional perspectives from the most involved non-claimant states, Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States—as well as two multilateral organizations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union. Despite their geographic, political, and economic differences, it is clear that very real strategic interests drive all these non-claimant stakeholders when it comes to developments in the South China Sea. This is perhaps unsurprising given regional stakeholders’ dependence on critical sea lines of communication for shipping. The South China Sea contains the main arteries of global trade, with more than $5 trillion of the world’s [End Page 2] seaborne trade passing through its waters every year.2 These are also vital energy lifelines, providing transit for a third of global crude oil and half of global liquefied natural gas.3 For East Asian countries like South Korea and Japan, dependence is particularly acute with approximately 66% and 60%, respectively, of their energy imports passing through the South China Sea.4 Given vested economic interests, these regional stakeholders are wary of disruptions to trade from a geopolitical crisis, or outright conflict, over the contested waters. Another commonality among the non-claimant states is a fundamental interest in maintaining freedom of navigation and the rights of passage and overflight in the South China Sea. All of the non-claimants also call for peaceful resolution of the disputes in accordance with international norms and law. This is particularly true for the two multilateral institutions examined here. ASEAN, as Alice Ba argues, needs to see a peaceful, negotiated outcome to the disputes; anything less would threaten the organization’s fundamental approach of pursuing consensus-based solutions in the face of great-power interests. For the European Union, which, as Mathieu Duchâtel notes, sees itself as a normative power, failure to support international legal outcomes would similarly threaten the institution’s approach to collective security. Efforts by non-claimant parties to uphold a rules-based order and preserve access to the maritime commons can help consolidate a broader understanding of acceptable actions by the claimant states. Over time, this may reinforce pressure on any claimants that choose to engage in unacceptable behavior. Beyond diplomatic statements calling for de-escalation and peaceful resolution of the disputes, several of the non-claimant states have undertaken specific maritime deployments in the South China Sea to signal their interest, concern, and resolve. These range from the high-profile freedom of navigation operations undertaken by the United States, which Admiral Thomas Fargo describes, to quieter missions undertaken by Australia, which Rory Medcalf notes signal that Canberra will continue to assert its rights and encourage a rules-based approach. India, Abhijit Singh writes, has also increased its operational presence in the South China Sea, with a contingent [End Page 3] of four frigates completing a two-month tour in June 2015 and one frigate making a subsequent deployment to the Philippines in November. Several non-claimant states have also stepped up their military cooperation with and arms sales to some of the Southeast Asian...