ASEAN Political-Security Community: Challenges of establishing regional security in the Southeast Asia

Abstract

Throughout the post-World War 2 history, Japan has looked on as a passive observer of the events happening in the Korean peninsular despite the peninsula’s geographical proximity and undeniable importance for her security. Neither the outbreak nor results of the Korean War, for example, were influenced by Japan’s action. She was not able to change the continuos division and conflicting relations between North (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and South (the Republic of Korea) Koreas either. Other major neighbors, namely the US, the former Soviet Union, and China, played more active roles and had certain responsibilities in the establishment of the peninsula’s present situation. Even after the size of Japan’s economy, an important potential political power source, became undeniably huge and the basic character of international system, namely the Cold War situation, was changed, this impression of Japan’s passive, if not nonexistent, Korea policy has not changed much. To be exact, Japan played no minor role in South Korea’s achievement in becoming one of Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) through her provision of official developmental assistance (ODA) and private investment. But Japan’s ODA to South Korea was often either a response to American requests for strategic aid or, by building infrastructure, a foundation by which Japanese industry advanced on the South Korean market. Therefore, if Japan contributed to the economic growth of South Korea, it was a byproduct rather than the result of a grand strategy for the peninsular. When we turn attention to North Korea, Japan’s appearance has been even less visible. She did not earnestly attempt to draw North Korean society out of its isolation. Through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the Japanese