ASEAN and the response to regional crisis: the limits of integration

Abstract

Introduction Southeast Asia was hit by financial crises in 1997-1999 and again by the global financial catastrophe of 2007-2009. In both cases, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the region’s premiere multilateral institution, responded by facilitating the push for greater regional integration. Yet, in the aftermath of both crises, ASEAN has actually achieved relatively low levels of economic, political and social integration. What accounts for this limited institutional development? This chapter argues that the answer to this question lies in the fact that ASEAN has never been a strong instrument of regional integration. As a regional institution, it has smoothed out political difficulties between its member states, but its activities have never promoted full-fledged economic, political or security integration in any substantial way. ASEAN’s relationship with its member states hinges on the institution being as minimally invasive as possible in their sovereign affairs. ASEAN’s focus on non-interference is a defining attribute of the institution from when it was first created in 1967. In many important ways, the same factors that made the protection of sovereignty paramount in 1967 drive ASEAN today. So long as the ASEAN states continue to believe that the preservation of their sovereignty is key to their survival as viable states, ASEAN’s functional level of regional integration will remain low. This will create a gulf between ASEAN’s rhetorical aspirations and its institutional capabilities. This observation contrasts with many other studies of ASEAN – particularly constructivist studies – which emphasise the norm and community-building aspects of the organisation (Acharya 2013; Busse 1999; Caballero-Anthony 2014). This study does not deny that ASEAN forms the basis of a nascent Southeast Asian community, but the commitment of regional citizens and elites to that community is seriously diluted by their focus on and commitment to more parochial identities and interests. The chapter is divided into the following sections: Section one explains the paper’s main argument, using the theoretical framework of Saurugger and Terpan to set the questions about regional integration and ASEAN that we must answer. The analytical categories identified by the framework demonstrate thatthe bonds of economic self-interest, political affinity and social cohesion that are necessary to further regional integration are only minimally present in the case of ASEAN. The chapter then examines the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), a regional financial instrument that includes ASEAN and the major Asian powers – i.e. China, Japan and South Korea. CMIM is a direct product of the 1997 economic crisis and was given further impetus by the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. However, it is in its preliminary stages and remains untested and restrained by complex political concerns. In contrast to the CMIM, the ASEAN Community (AC) is a genuine effort on the part of ASEAN to further regional political, security, economic and cultural integration. However, a closer examination of the AC and its component parts reveals that it has poor prospects of success, largely because its member states continue to choose the preservation of their sovereignty over effective regional integration. The conclusion of the chapter is that ASEAN has responded ineffectively to two major financial crises. The political, economic and social divisions that exist between the ASEAN states cannot be easily overcome. They ensure that the organisation remains a relatively loose collection of sovereign states.