Abstract

In this chapter the interception hypothesis is put to work in a third legal context, which can be generally characterized as mapping the account of facts on to the system of general norms in legal decision making. In this context, the hypothesis is supposed to elucidate the relation between (a set of) legal facts and (a set of) normative legal consequences. From here on I will refer to this relation in the present context by means of the rather Kelsenian, but not uncommon term ‘ascription’: what happens in legal decision making is ascribing legal consequences to legal facts. Now, can we see ascription as a value of the variable relation between Event and Interpretation? Does the former show the double hierarchy characteristic of the latter?KeywordsCivil CodePublic ProsecutorLabour ContractLegal DecisionLegal DiscourseThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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