As nossas mentes deontoutilitaristas

Cinara Nahra

doi:10.4013/fsu.2013.142.03

Abstract

In this article I discuss the standard responses given by people for moral dilemmas related to life and death, proposing a philosophical model that I call “the utilitarian-deontological (deontoutilitarian) model ” to explain how the majority of people respond to these dilemmas. I suggest that when people make moral judgements they use a system of judgments that combines utilitarian and deontological considerations, a system that is primarily deontological, and accept that to kill innocent people is wrong. Faced, however, with the necessity of having to kill someone to save more people, they will typically say that it is right to do this, unless they have to use their own personal force or have to have some kind of personal contact with the person(s) to be sacrificed. In these cases they will refrain from carrying out the act. However, typically they will agree that it is right to kill the person even using their personal force or having some kind of contact with the person if death is inevitable or in catastrophic situations, in which unless you kill one person hundreds of people will die as a consequence. The majority of us, however, will come back to their deontological judgment again if we are faced for example with a “blackmail” situation, in which someone asks us to carry out a killing and if we refuse they threaten to kill everybody. In this situation people are outraged with the offer and will typically judge the situation in a deontological way again, saying that it is wrong to carry out the killing. Key words: trolley problems, moral dilemmas, deontoutilitarianism, utilitariandeontological model.

Highlights

Resumo Neste artigo são discutidas as respostas padrão dadas pelas pessoas para dilemas morais relacionados a vida e morte, propondo um modelo filosófico que chamaremos de “modelo deontoutilitarista”
Marc Hauser provides an interesting example of how little people have access to the principles underlying their moral judgements, even when they think they do (Hauser, 2009)
Hauser’s father judged this act as being impermissible (Hauser, 2009)2. Realising that his justification for the earlier cases did not hold up he said that the previous cases were all artificial. This is a good example, showing that people do not have access to the moral principles that they use when making moral judgements, and, it illustrates my point in this article, that when people make moral judgements they use a system of judgments that combines utilitarian and deontological considerations, a system that is primarily deontological, but allows people to breach the deontological rules for utilitarian considerations

Summary

Introduction

Resumo Neste artigo são discutidas as respostas padrão dadas pelas pessoas para dilemas morais relacionados a vida e morte, propondo um modelo filosófico que chamaremos de “modelo deontoutilitarista”. These reasons could be (a) the inevitability of deaths, i.e., when the person will die anyway, in these situation people tend to make utilitarian judgements again, and/or (b) when the cost/benefit of overcoming the deontological constraint is very high, with many lives being saved.5 (v) We become deontological again if the killing has to be done to satisfy, say for example, the outrageous requirements of a perceived evil person who blackmails you, threatening to kill more people if you refuse to comply and demands that you actively carry out the killing.

Results

Conclusion