Artificial Intelligence in the Administration of Justice: Theoretical Aspects of the Legal Regulation (Articulation of the Issue)

Abstract

Prospects of the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the administration of justice actualize a set of legal issues that are not only applied but also theoretical in nature, including the issue of the formation of the legal concept of “artificial intelligence” for the purposes of legal regulation. The legal academic literature describes a tendency to attribute signs of subjectivity to artificial intelligence, in connection with which the paper attempts to carry out a critical analysis of foundations of such approach. The authors explain inadmissibility of inclusion of such a characteristic as a legal capacity in the concept of “artificial intelligence.” They also argue that in jurisprudence it is useless to apply definitions of artificial intelligence based on the description of technical-technological characteristics because it has no influence on the legal regulation. The incorporation of artificial intelligence as a sociocultural phenomenon into legal reality requires either an independent term for its designation in the field of law or the filling of this concept with a specific legal content. The development of such content should be carried out within the framework of the paradigm of the legal science, since the use of categories and definitions of other branches and spheres of public life without being adopted to the legal field, is unlikely to be effective for the regulatory purposes.