Artifact or Meaningful Theoretical Constructs?: Examining Evidence for Nonbelief- and Belief-Based Attitude Change Processes

Abstract

Fishbein and Middlestadt (1995) argued that evidence for nonbelief‐based attitude change is primarily artifactual, resulting from inadequate one, belief‐based measurement of attitudes and beliefs. Thus, all attitude change occurs through this process. In this article, we present three arguments in response. First, evidence exists suggesting that some attitude change processes are best conceptualized as relatively nonbelief based. Second, evidence is presented of attitudes resulting from relatively nonbelief‐ and belief‐based attitude change processes, as assessed by the same measure of beliefs within the same study. Third, studies have found substantive and meaningful differences in the attitudes resulting from what are posited to be different attitude change processes. Together, these arguments provide a strong case for the existence and differential consequences of both belief‐ and nonbelief‐based attitude change processes.