Army and Islam in Indonesia

Abstract

T HE SEEDS OF CONFLICT are evident between Indonesia's two most powerful forces-the army and Islam. Suspicion and distrust exist between them while a growing sense of frustration pervades the Islamic mass organizations. The distrust is of more than recent origin but was thought to have been overcome after the coup attempt of September 30, i965 (Gestapu) when the army and Muslim organizations worked in concert to decimate the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its infrastructure. Since that time, however, relations have worsened to the extent that both sides admit the gravity of the situation. Considerations of power influence the relationship. The army, the dominant force today in Indonesia, is unlikely to agree to the unhindered mobilization of potential rivals. Islamic organizations have a large mass following whose support provides a power-base independent of military influence. The military would, no doubt, be suspicious of any autonomous, well-organized force. The extent of mutual suspicion, however, exceeds that of strategic considerations. The distrust has its roots in cultural and historical factors. Much of the officer corps is within the Javanese cultural tradition, a tradition which views Islam as a discordant element. From the time Islam took root in Java in the x5th century divisiveness has existed between the ethereal, syncretic Javanese court culture and the proselytizing, assertive Islamic culture. The Javanese aristocracy (prijaii) was more amenable to Dutch rule than to what it perceived as the clearly greater threat of Islamic fanaticism. Even the much-publicized Islamic Reform Movement of this century, while changing the religious practices and secular behavior of many santri, had little effect on the perceptions which proponents of the antagonistic Indic and Islamic civilizations held of each other.' Many of those army officers who are part of the Javanese cultural tra-