Arms Control with and without Agreements

Abstract

Their value depends upon their terms, and even more, on their effects. If reduces the risks of war, strengthens sound international norms, and contributes to world stability, as has the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, then it is worthy. But if inflates expectations without much, if any, concrete benefit, as did the interwar arms pacts and especially the Kellogg-Briand Pact, then it is not of much value and can even have adverse effects. While the logic here is irrefutable, the passion for an agreement is barely resistible. American society is result oriented. To be without any is to invite serious criticism?witness the cry against Ronald Reagan during the recent campaign. To achieve agreement, even one that leaves the strategic plans of both sides relatively unaffected, is to earn acclaim. Such a standard invariably proves counterpro ductive. As Dean Acheson said, we can never get a good arms control unless we are fully prepared to live without one.