Abstract

The events of the first years of war in Ukraine clearly suggest an increase of the army’s involvement in the country’s public life. This tendency has to be regarded largely as a new and unprecedented phenomenon of the political life of the Commonwealth, visible from the outbreak of the Khmelnytsky Uprising to at least the 70s of the 17th century. It is possible to believe that this state of affairs stemmed from two main reasons- the endeavours of some of the groups and representatives of the elites, in numerous cases also simultaneously present within the circle of the army elders, to establishing their influences and political role through navigating or manipulating the army, one of the instruments of gaining these influences and attitude of a broader circle of the soldiers from nobility, who saw in themselves not only a military branch of the country, but also fully-fledged citizens, entitled to co-deciding on all the aspects of the Crown just like the nobility. This tendency can be noticed already during the interregnum and elections in 1648 (i.e. in the time of the Lviv circle of the general army in September, making essentially illegal, even if later approved, election of a commander-in-chief), but the decisive influence on the choice of a new sovereign was nevertheless not granted to the army. In the coming months and years, the control over the army triggered a rivalry between the monarch, royal court, the key senators, generals and other people from the circle of the elders and the elites of aristocracy. As a consequence the army was becoming politicised. At the same time critical attitude of the soldiers’ circles towards the country (the monarch, royal court and senate) was building up, in the largest part generated by the destruction of financial and military apparatus of the Commonwealth escalating in the war conditions. Rebellious atmosphere triggered mainly by economic factors was more frequently occurring in the army. A new esprit de corps of the army, being created from 1648, was inspiring the soldiers to demand changes in the country’s politics, including entitlements which had not been so far granted to the army. Simultaneously, the forms of self-governing organisation of the army (the military circles) were being consolidated and solidified, a more permanent programme expressing soldiers’ aspirations was being crystallised and planks for the future and more dramatic rebellions and confederacies, easily submitting to the political inspiration, were being created.

Highlights

  • It is possible to believe that this state of affairs stemmed from two main reasons- the endeavours of some of the groups and representatives of the elites, in numerous cases simultaneously present within the circle of the army elders, to establishing their influences and political role through navigating or manipulating the army, one of the instruments of gaining these influences and attitude of a broader circle of the soldiers from nobility, who saw in themselves a military branch of the country, and fully-fledged citizens, entitled to co-deciding on all the aspects of the Crown just like the nobility

  • This tendency can be noticed already during the interregnum and elections in 1648, but the decisive influence on the choice of a new sovereign was not granted to the army

  • In the coming months and years, the control over the army triggered a rivalry between the monarch, royal court, the key senators, generals and other people from the circle of the elders and the elites of aristocracy

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Summary

Introduction

Poseł skrytykował ponadto wybór wojewody ruskiego na wodza oraz domagał się informacji i wyjaśnień w sprawie przejęcia sporych sum, które wojsko, a właściwie Radziejowski jako komisarz, za publiczną rękojmią we Lwowie pieniądze pobrał, a już o wojsku, ani o pieniądzach nic nie wiemy[40]. Jak podejrzewano w otoczeniu Jana Kazimierza i kanclerza Ossolińskiego, myślał o jakimś wystąpieniu przeciw królowi, na przykład przez sprowokowanie konfederacji wojskowej, o co był podejrzewany, może rzeczywiście, wbrew królowi, który świeżo dogadał się z Chmielnickim w sprawie tymczasowego zawieszenia broni i rozpoczęcia rozmów, przystąpił do planowania zimowej kampanii na Ukrainie[43], na co jednak nie było wtedy żadnych szans powodzenia.

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