ARMENIAN ISSUE IN SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS IN 1921

Abstract

The article studies Soviet and Turkish approaches to Armenia and its territorial problems after Sovietization of the republic. Traditionally Russia and Turkey were adversaries and the Caucasus was the main area of their active rivalry. The research shows that Moscow Treaty on Friendship and Brotherhood signed in 1921 was as not the final point of geopolitical contest. It proceeded after the treaty but was not as apparent as in the past. The unsolved Armenian issue became one of the obstacles to the full inclusion of the Transcaucasia into the Bolsheviks sphere of power. The Kemal and Bolshevik governments weren’t able to begin state building without getting over conflicts in the national peripheries. In the Armenian question, Soviet Russia turned out to be more compliant than in other Caucasian contradictions. It was important to maintain influence in Soviet Azerbaijan, to gain a foothold in Georgia and not to cede Batum to Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey refused to implement the Treaty of Alexandropol, as it needed Russian assistance in the struggle for independence. The novelty of the research lies in the study of Armenian issue as a part of Soviet and Turkey within international and regional framework of both governments policy. The author introduced into scientific use the archival documents of the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation and the Russian Archive of Social and Political History. The unpublished material shows the diplomatic backstage that accompanied the seemingly peaceful interaction between Turkey and Soviet Russia. First, the order of events in 1921 was studied consistently, which became a turning point in the solution of the Armenian question. Armenia, having found itself an object of rivalry between two quite young states with an unstable position, lost a number of territories and the chances for restoration within the boundaries defined by the Treaty of Sevres. The denouement was also possible in connection with the position of the leading world powers, which actually left the Caucasus as a sphere of influence and were keen on resolving other problems of the post-war world