Abstract
A widespread, and perhaps currently prevalent, view of Aristotle's discussion of the mind in De A nima III 4 is that he assimilates the process of as far as possible, if not totally, to that of sensation.1 It will be argued in the following, however, that Aristotle is in fact concerned to explain where differs from sensation.2 When the chapter is read as a whole, his aim can be seen to be to distinguish between two kinds of thinking: one which is closely related to sensation and one which is a process peculiar to mind. These may be termed thinking and autonomous thinking respectively. The latter, as it appears from De Anima III 7-8, includes both contemplative and about concrete objects in their absence; furthermore, it employs the imagination where apprehensive employs sensation.
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