Arguments and Able Man Colud Refute: Parmenides 133b-134e

Abstract

In his polemic against Theory of Forms put forward by young Socrates in Parmenides 128 e-130 a, Parmenides does not save best until last. After probing questions about extent of Form-world and nature of participation, after fireworks of Third Man Argument, there comes a curious argument that Parmenides himself hints is no good. At 133 b 4 and following, Parmenides says that only an intelligent and experienced person, one who feels no horror at prospect of a long, drawn-out argument, would be able to uphold position that Forms are knowable. It surely follows from this that Plato believed that Forms are knowable, and hence that any argument that purported to prove contrary must be In that argument of 133 b-134 e does try to show that we cannot know Forms, Plato must have believed that this part of Parmenides' polemic contains a subtle, but discoverable error. Cornford, in his Plato and Parmenides, agrees that there is an error in Parmenides' reasoning but not a subtle one. It is, he says, almost grossly fallacious. (One wonders about qualification implied by 'almost'l) The fallacy, according to Cornford, lies in taking Form of Mastery as if it were the master of Slavery or of anything else.3 One must not confuse Forms with their perfect instances. Unfortunately, Plato makes such a confusion many times. I do not propose here to rehearse arguments showing that Plato, at least at one time, held view that every Form possesses that quality with which it is associated. It is surely sufficient to mention that Third Man Argument, which precedes passage with which I am dealing, rests on precisely same Self-Predication assumption.8 If Self-