Arendt, role theory and the ethical evaluation of action

Abstract

In what way can social action be simultaneously inquired into and ethically evaluated by social theory? This paper explores the responsibility sociology has with regard to the political and ethical implications of its knowledge production and does so through a case study examination of the sociological concept of role. It compares and evaluates the different orientations that ground the concept of role and Arendt’s concept of action, which is then expanded to address the critique of the social sciences by theorists like Arendt and Foucault. The paper engages a particular tradition of reflexive sociology in the context of the danger of banal evil (Eichmann) and in the context of modern structures of domination that makes that danger more prevalent. Arguing that a theoretical non-empirical reflexivity is called for, and drawing on the phenomenological reflexivity of Berger and the constitutive reflexivity of Blum and McHugh, the paper seeks to demonstrate the need for a reflexive awareness of the actor’s responsibility for action and the theorist’s responsibility for formulating action that can make conceptual space for reasoned evaluation oriented by and to principle.