Toward a Critical Analysis of Role

Abstract

The Frankfurt School distinguishes role as a sociological concept from role as a phenomenon, and the question becomes what role as a phenomenon may be like. On the basis of an argument adapted from Simmel and Schutz, the hypothesis is raised that roles are everyday schemes based on processes of typification and idealization. It is argued that the latter allows for the intrusion of power into role structures, and, in fact, the use of roles as the expression of political control. Thus, not only role theory (as traditional theory in Horkheimer's terms) but also society's role structures invite the criticisms of critical sociologists who want to contribute through their conceptual work to the liberation of individuals from the constraints of their repressive society. The topic of role is debated in ideological terms in present-day sociology. It is claimed that this concept is apt to conceal rather than reveal features of the phenomena envisaged (Furth, 1971; cf. Habermas, 1963: 173). It has been proposed that the role concept be abandoned (Coulson, 1972: 128; cf. Dewey, 1969: 309 ff.). This proposition has been rejected on the grounds that the role concept is needed because sociologists have to account for aggregate phenomena on as general a level as we (Komarovsky, 1973: 654). However, this alleged necessity of role analysis does not rule out its implicit conservatism. One must take seriously the criticism that role theory favors the preservation rather than reformation of inequitable structures in society, whether the unsatisfactory state of role analysis derives from limitations of sociological theory, or from the nature of roles themselves. In other words, the questions which arise are: Is the ideological character of role theory due to the shortcomings in the nature or history of the role concept as part of sociological theory? Or is it rather that role theory is ideological because roles per se are instruments of suppression in bourgeois society? This first of these two questions suggests that roles may be accounted for in sociological terms other than those of traditional role analysis. This assumes a distinction between the phenomenon of role and its conceptualization, and it implies that the traditional conceptualization of roles does not adequately account for role as a phenomenon. It is the first aim of this paper to revisit role as a phenomenon in order to make clear some of the fallacies of role as it now exists as a sociological concept. This leads to the second question, namely, whether the ideological character of role theory is due to the repressive nature of roles in bourgeois society. If role as a phenomenon is understood as part of the organization of production relationships in society and, secondly, if typification and idealization rather than merely patterned norm expectations are seen as the essential role elements, a new perspective on role as a phenomenon emerges. Roles are identified as cognitive and cultural forms which denote production relationships and the state apparatus in two ways: namely, insofar as they are repressive but also insofar as they are potentially changeable. It is the second aim of this paper to document the repressive nature of role as a phenomenon, and to discuss the question whether changes in the role structure of society can contribute to the diminution or elimination of repression. In other words: Can a change in roles provide for a political and social liberation which would affect the organization of production and power in society? The theoretical background of my argument is that of the Frankfurt School, especially Max Horkheimer and Jurgen Habermas (Jay, 1973; Arato and Gebhardt, 1978; McCarthy 1978; O'Neill, 1978). The basic standpoint will be outlined before role theory is discussed.