Abstract
In this paper, we examine whether a political budget cycle exists in municipal governments that fall under tight financial and institutional regulation by senior orders of government. For other levels of government, there is evidence that politicians initiate popular programs in election years and delay the unpopular tax increases after the election. Using a sample of 444 Ontario municipalities, with few exceptions, no such evidence was found. The results are the same regardless of the length of the term (three or four year), municipal size (small, medium, or large), and the governance system (one or two-tier). The paper concludes with possible explanations as to why there are no opportunistic manipulations of municipal budgets.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
