Are Inductive Generalizations Quantifiable?

Abstract

T seems to be taken for granted by philosophers and logicians that in ordinary life, commerce, and science inductive generalizations are expressed in quantified propositions of the form: All S is P, or that if they are not, then it makes no difference or indeed even clarifies their sense to so express them.1 It is my intention in the present paper to attack the general view. Specifically, I intend to show, (1) that in the ordinary business of life and science inductive generalizations possess a grammar which precludes their being quantified, and (2) that it is not indifferent whether inductive generalizations retain their actual forms and grammar or are given the quantified forms and grammar proposed by logicians, but, on the contrary, the most unpalatable consequences result from accepting the logicians' propositions, consequences that otherwise do not exist. Finally, (3) I shall discuss briefly the well-known thesis of Popper's that inductive generalizations must be rejected from any consistent and workable account of the methods of science.2 I shall argue that Popper's position is untenable, although agreeing with him that universal inductive generalizations are a logical impossibility.