Abstract
One argument used by detractors of human embryonic stem cell research (hESCR) invokes Kant's formula of humanity, which proscribes treating persons solely as a means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves. According to Fuat S. Oduncu, for example, adhering to this imperative entails that human embryos should not be disaggregated to obtain pluripotent stem cells for hESCR. Given that human embryos are Kantian persons from the time of their conception, killing them to obtain their cells for research fails to treat them as ends in themselves.This argument assumes two points that are rather contentious given a Kantian framework. First, the argument assumes that when Kant maintains that humanity must be treated as an end in itself, he means to argue that all members of the species Homo sapiens must be treated as ends in themselves; that is, that Kant regards personhood as co-extensive with belonging to the species Homo sapiens. Second, the argument assumes that the event of conception is causally responsible for the genesis of a Kantian person and that, therefore, an embryo is a Kantian person from the time of its conception.In this paper, I will present challenges against these two assumptions by engaging in an exegetical study of some of Kant's works. First, I will illustrate that Kant did not use the term "humanity" to denote a biological species, but rather the capacity to set ends according to reason. Second, I will illustrate that it is difficult given a Kantian framework to denote conception (indeed any biological event) as causally responsible for the creation of a person. Kant ascribed to a dualistic view of human agency, and personhood, according to him, was derived from the supersensible capacity for reason. To argue that a Kantian person is generated due to the event of conception ignores Kant's insistence in various aspects of his work that it is not possible to understand the generation of a person qua a physical operation. Finally, I will end the paper by drawing from Allen Wood's work in Kantian philosophy in order to generate an argument in favor of hESCR.
Highlights
One argument constantly used by detractors of human embryonic stem cell research invokes Immanuel Kant's formula of humanity, the second principal formulation of the categorical imperative
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Groundwork, from hereonin), Kant states the second principle as follows: I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end it itself, not merely as a
In "The Stem Cell Slide: Be Alert to the Beginnings of Evil," Michael Novak uses the formula of humanity as the theoretical ground for rejecting the use of human embryos for stem cell research
Summary
One argument constantly used by detractors of human embryonic stem cell research invokes Immanuel Kant's formula of humanity, the second principal formulation of the categorical imperative. Perhaps this may incite Oduncu to argue in favor of the moral status of the human embryo more from an anthropological standpoint than a biological one Philosophers such as he and Novak assume, rather than argue, that a Kantian person begins to exist due to the empirical event of conception. According to the "restrictive view," when Kant argues that we must respect humanity within persons or human beings, he spoke of respecting the actual capacity to make rational choices In this sense, Wood is right when he maintains that the Kantian notion of humanity "does not refer to membership in any particular biological species" [42]. In his testimony to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Rabbi Elliot Dorff, Ph.D. argues that extracorporeal embryos have no legal or moral status outside the womb under Jewish law because " [o]utside of the womb... they have no such potential" to become persons
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