Are Frijda's “Laws of Emotion” Empirical?

Abstract

Abstract It is argued that 12 allegedly empirical “laws” of emotion, formulated by Frijda, are actually non-empirical, that is, a priori and necessarily true. It is shown that they can be derived from plausible definitions of the terms involved and presuppositions (axioms) that cannot be meaningfully denied. Given that the “laws” of Frijda are a priori and necessarily true, the evidence cited in their support must be reinterpreted as merely indicating that the diagnostic and investigatory procedures involved have been adequate. Conversely, evidence not consistent with the laws must be taken to indicate that the diagnostic and investigatory procedures have been faulty. The introduction of formal definitions of psychological terms and explicit statements of what is presupposed (axioms) is important for two purposes. First, it enables one to make a clear distinction between the non-empirical and the empirical which is important in order to prevent a waste of resources on pseudo-empirical research (attempting to test a priori and necessarily true propositions by empirical methods). Secondly, formalisation enables one to make inferences from given descriptive or general propositions, in other words, to derive outcomes and possibilities.