Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk toward Peace

Abstract

THE PURSUIT of peace in the Middle East has been a major item on the foreign policy agenda of every American president for the last quarter cen tury. Over this time significant objectives have been achieved, including the 1974 and 1975 disengagement agreements and the 1978 Camp David accords. A comprehensive regional peace, however, has eluded and frustrated all who have pur sued it. Therefore, when President George Bush announced a new Arab-Israeli peace initiative in March 1991, most observers viewed his proposal with understandable skepticism. Taking advantage of changed international conditions and applying the lessons of previous Middle East peace negotiating experiences, the Bush administration initiated a process that altered the search for Middle East peace. The conference held in Madrid at the end of October 1991 established a new framework for continuing negotiations, replacing the 1973 Geneva conference as the benchmark for future discussions of Middle East peace. Despite Israeli and American elections, terrorist attacks and military raids, slow but significant progress was achieved, and the process begun in Madrid con tinued throughout 1992. The ability of the Clinton administration to continue this process will have a significant impact on Middle East stability and, as a consequence, on American interests in the region. Those committed to negotiations are facing significant and growing challenges from those opposed. When the United States is not engaged in the search for peace, extremist forces gain strength. Islamic extremists gain in appeal when the peace process appears stalled. Israel's decision in December 1992 to yield to