Arab Spring and the Future of Political Islam

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Two years after the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, the trajectory and the outcome of the process are still uncertain. Whereas the autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt were overthrown, the alternate mechanism has not really worked. As per the Failed State Index, published in the US, Egypt has moved up from 49th to 31st position and Tunisia from 118th to 94th position. It is almost as expected. In the shadow of despotic regimes, no political alternative could develop and take roots, as a result of which, the incoming regimes made some of the very same mistakes that the outgoing regimes had made. Fragmentation of state authority has taken place to some extent in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. However, the good news is that there is a real agenda for democratization in the region and for the first time, elites are being put to test. Serious discussions on civil-military relations, the place of civil society organizations, transparency and the role of underground groups have all gained importance in the political arena. A complex process of adjustment will follow before the state authority is stabilized.The revolution in the Arab world has not stopped. The civil war in Syria has slowed the momentum of the Arab Spring because in many countries the people may be apprehensive of a similar fate visiting them if they agitated. However, the latest turn of events in Egypt suggest that the convulsions are likely to continue for many years until democracy takes roots. For that to happen, inclusive political process and tolerance amongst contending political players will be essential.Keeping in mind their importance and the unexpected nature of developments in the two important countries in the region, this article primarily focuses on the turmoil in Egypt and the impact of the Arab Spring on Turkey. Besides, the paper reflects on the future of political Islam in the region.Fresh Turmoil in EgyptThe emerging consensus is that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood have lost Egypt. The revolution against the Hosni Mubarak regime in early 2011 was literally leaderless but had the support of diverse sections of the Egyptian society; particularly the youth. The Muslim Brotherhood was not in the forefront of the revolution but was definitely its main beneficiary by virtue of being the best-organized social and political group. The military assumed power soon after Mubarak was over-thrown but gradually ceded power to the elected president in 2012. The president also made many changes amongst the senior positions in the armed forces including replacement of General Tantawi by General Sissy as the defence minister. However, there was a constant struggle between the judiciary and the old bureaucracy on the one hand, and Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other. Having won the presidency in the run-off with merely 51.7 per cent of the votes against a candidate identified with the old disgraced regime should have been a reminder to the president that neither he nor his party enjoyed an across- the-board support amongst the voters and that many non-Brotherhood revolutionaries would have voted for him believing his promise of national unity and inclusiveness.A series of missteps by Morsi like imposing media curbs, interference in the judicial processes including appointment of an ideologically aligned prosecutor-general, efforts to rush through a constitution without building national consensus around it, establishment of party control over state media, appointment of loyalists in key state positions, were only some of the measures taken by Morsi to hijack the revolutionary agenda. The biggest error of Morsi was the constitutional declaration of November 2012. He gave himself the powers to amend the constitution unilaterally and immunity to his decisions from judicial review, which brought all political elements other than the Muslim Brotherhood together in opposition to Morsi and his party. The new constitution was supposed to herald a new democratic future for Egypt. …