Abstract
The seminal work of [Myerson 1981] shows that the simple Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with monopoly reserves is optimal in single-item auctions where agents have independent and identically distributed private values. [Hartline and Roughgarden 2009] and others prove approximate analogs of this statement in the more general one-dimensional type, independent private values setting. This paper studies the design of ex-post incentive compatible and approximately optimal mechanism in an environment with interdependent values. We show that the VCG mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible under a matroid feasibility constraint. We also give conditions under which the VCG mechanism with monopoly reserves could still generate near-optimal expected revenues.
Published Version
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