Abstract

Canadian courts treat foreign law as fact. When foreign law governs a dispute as a result of choice-of-law rules, the parties must plead and prove its contents, typically through expert testimony. The trial court assesses the evidence and applies the law, as it was proven, to the case at hand. But what happens when a litigant disagrees with the trial court’s view of foreign law and appeals its decision? Appellate courts do not interfere with findings of fact unless the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error. Conversely, appellate courts are free to impose their views on questions of law. Should appellate courts defer to the trial judge or get the final word on issues of foreign law? This article addresses the disagreement between appellate courts over this issue, which the Supreme Court of Canada dodged in a recent case. It delves into the complex features of foreign law, insisting on the distinction between its evidentiary treatment (as fact) and its nature and function in litigation (as law). It makes the case for a nuanced approach to the standard of review which accounts for the many ways in which problems of foreign law present themselves to the courts. As a result, appellate courts should characterize specific questions of foreign law as questions of fact or questions of law rather than attempting to pigeon-hole foreign law itself, an abstraction capable of being both. Ultimately, correctness and deference should coexist in the appellate review of foreign law findings.

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