Anzus: Shield or Shroud?

Abstract

Canberra and Wellington can hardly feel encouraged by the international developments of this year. In Laos the crisis has deepened; South Africa has withdrawn from the Commonwealth; Britain has applied to join the European Economic Community; and the Soviet Union has intensified its pressure on the West. These events underline the necessity of taking a careful look at the shelter to which Australia and New Zealand can turn for protection from the dangers of a precarious power balance. In essence, this shelter consists of a mutual security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United StatesANZUSand a later extension intended to provide additional comfort SEATO. However, the structural functionalism of this Pacific bulwark stands in stark contrast to the sentimental interior decoration. Fading daguerrotypes of the old British Empire obscure the occasional snapshots of the new multi-racial Commonwealth. Despite this evidence of political nostalgia the security guarantee by the United States remains the core of Australian and New Zealand defence policy. For the United States, on the other hand, the ANZUS treaty was never more than a peripheral concession. The tenth anniversary of the signing of ANZUS provides an appropriate occasion for examining two questions: Is the treaty adequate for the present security requirements of Australia and New Zealand? What use have these countries made of the protection which the treaty afforded them over the past decade?