Anti-corruption disclosure: evidence from the natural experiment of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive

Abstract

AbstractDrawing upon institutional theory, we investigate how companies react to coercive pressures which impose anti-corruption disclosure practices. We adopt the concept of change in the institutionalized field and investigate the impact of the natural experiment of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD) implementation on a company’s choice for disclosing its anti-corruption policy. We examine the relationship between firm linkages with the external environment, proxied by board independence and ownership dispersion, and anti-corruption disclosure. We use a sample of 72 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange over the period of 2015–2019 that were subject to the NFRD legislation. The evidence from the Tobit model shows that the linkages with the external environment differentiate company reactions to the implementation of the mandatory reporting legislation. In particular, greater company linkages via interdependent directors and ownership dispersion increase the scope of the anti-corruption disclosure in the post-NFRD period. Our study offers policy implications suggesting that corporate scrutiny and exposure to external constituencies may improve implementation of legislation into company practice and enhance anti-corruption disclosure.