Anticorruption Commissions: The “Hong Kong Model” Revisited

Abstract

The international donor community has, in the last few years, discouraged the use of specialised anticorruption bodies as the spearhead of the attack on corruption, for reasons that have never been sufficiently explained or critically examined. The academic objections to replicating the Hong Kong solution in other countries are first, that the context in which corruption occurs in Hong Kong is unique and for that reason the solution cannot be exported; second, that the remedy is too strong, too dangerous to be applied elsewhere. The risk of an anticorruption body like the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) becoming an instrument of political oppression is simply too great to warrant its use; third, establishing and maintaining an anticorruption body at the strength required to deal with corruption is said to be inordinately costly. The fourth objection is a frontal assault on the very concept of an anticorruption body as a means of tackling corruption. The answer, according to this view, lies in governance and policy reform. These objections have been adopted by the international donor institutions, apparently for reasons that have little to do with any in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of successful anticorruption bodies. Over the past decade numerous alternative methods of tackling corruption have been proposed and attempted. The results have been disappointing. By contrast, Hong Kong remains firmly on top of its corruption problem, the ICAC continues to enjoy a public support of 98–99% and this special administrative region of China continues to improve its standing in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), one of the few places in the world to do so. In Botswana where the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) was modelled on the ICAC with modifications, the country is rated the least corrupt in Africa by a considerable margin and is in the top 25% of countries worldwide. Madagascar which modelled its Bureau Indépendant Anti-Corruption (BIANCO) even more closely on the HK ICAC has made good progress in the short time it has been operational. Is it not time to reconsider the rejection by the donor community of the “Hong Kong model?” Should we not be examining more profoundly than previously how Hong Kong managed to get and stay on top of corruption? Should the donor community not be helping those countries that have decided they want a separate anticorruption body get the design and the operational policies and practices right?