Anticipated Communication in the Ultimatum Game

Mario Capizzani,Andrew Musau,Luigi Mittone,Antonino Vaccaro

doi:10.3390/g8030029

Mario Capizzani, Andrew Musau + Show 2 more

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https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030029

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Abstract

Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question whether anticipated verbal communication can be effective in increasing offers. We implement a between-subjects experimental design in the ultimatum game with strategy method manipulating the form of anticipated verbal communication (no communication, one-sided communication from proposers and two-sided communication) and find that offers are significantly higher in the presence of anticipated two-sided communication. However, anticipated one-sided communication from proposers has no effect on offers, suggesting, as found in previous studies, that it is the anticipation of feedback that is relevant.

Highlights

The effect of anticipated communication on altruistic behavior has become a focus of growing research interest in recent years
An important research question that the present study addresses is whether strategic considerations crowd out impulses towards generosity that are triggered by anticipated communication
This paper has investigated whether the anticipated communication result of Xiao and Houser [1], Ellingsen and Johannesson [2] and Brook and Servátka [3] is robust to the presence of strategic considerations

Summary

Introduction

The effect of anticipated communication on altruistic behavior has become a focus of growing research interest in recent years. In choosing what amount to offer, the proposer in the ultimatum game may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer. We refer to such fears as strategic considerations. An important research question that the present study addresses is whether strategic considerations crowd out impulses towards generosity that are triggered by anticipated communication. This is important in testing the robustness of the anticipated communication effect but generates insights on the little-known role of anticipated communication in unrestricted bargaining settings

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