Abstract

Relations between Brussels and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) worsened during and after the 2015 migration crisis. In order to see to what extent CEE citizens contributed to and/or resonated with this new state of affairs, this paper investigates public opinion before the migration crisis in seven CEE EU Member States. We inquire whether the main issues of the rift (CEE political elites’ opposition to following EU decisions and immigration and their emphasis on sovereignism, nationalism, Christian Europe and historical traumas) could also be traced to public stances towards these issues before the migration crisis. We used the ISSP National Identity module conducted in 2013 and 2014 in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia. The results show that opposition to EU supranationalism was not linked to ethnic nationalism and religious identity (except in Hungary). Contrary to political elites, who emphasised the cultural threat posed by migration, public opinion was more concerned with the economic threat. Moreover, the perception of cultural threat was not linked to opposing EU supranationalism in any of the countries. However, particularly support for sovereignism (in almost all the countries), but also pride in national history (in some countries) correlated negatively with support for EU supranationalism. The results suggest that political elites can bypass public opinion to construct an anti-EU climate, however not out of thin air. The conditions for such a process were present in Hungary with its emerging transnational cleavage, which shows the importance of cleavages in studying Euroscepticism.

Highlights

  • Relations between Brussels and Central and Eastern European (CEE) Member States worsened during and after the 2015 migration crisis

  • CEE Member States considerably differed in terms of support for EU supranationalism

  • The question of following EU decisions in the Latvian and Estonian cases most probably refers to the Russian minority question, as Baltic Russian respondents agreed to a greater extent than ethnic Estonian or Latvian respondents that Latvia or Estonia should follow EU decisions, even if it disagrees with them

Read more

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Relations between Brussels and Central and Eastern European (CEE) Member States worsened during and after the 2015 migration crisis. That the contention had spread to other post-socialist EU Member States was evident from a letter to the European Commission (EC) signed by the Ministers of the Interior of Visegrád states, as well as those of Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia in June 2020 In the letter, they reiterated “strong objection to mandatory relocation of asylum seekers and migrants in any shape or form” (Hamáček et al, 2020). A comparison of public opinion in CEE before the migration crisis regarding their support for EU decisions is largely absent This comparison can provide a general answer to whether the public’s sociodemographic characteristics, aspects of identification and social attitudes explained opposition to EU supranationalism before these issues were politicised in CEE. It can help to understand the background of the rift between Brussels and CEE

THEORETICAL-CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
AIMS AND HYPOTHESES
DATA AND METHODS
Survey measures
Analysis
RESULTS
Respondents’ identities and attitudes towards their nation and Europe
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
ETHICAL APPROVAL
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call