Another Failed Transcendental Argument

Abstract

Many have been attracted to the idea that skepticism can be refuted by means of some sort of transcendental argument. Such an argument would show that if one has experience, then the skeptical claim that one lacks knowledge of various propositions is mistaken: the truth of the propositions doubted by the skeptic is a condition for the possibility of experience (or else justified belief of those propositions is such a condition). The success of such an argument obviously depends upon careful examination of what is necessarily involved in having experience. It is natural to focus upon the ideas or concepts which one must possess in order to count as an experience, as opposed to an organism which reacts differentially to diverse stimuli. It is, equivalently, natural to focus upon the thoughts one must be able to frame in order to count as an experiencer. This focus is not only natural but, further, eminently sensible given the dialectical situation: since the starting point of the transcendental argument must be one which the skeptic will find non-questionbegging and otherwise acceptable, it would be sensible for the transcendental arguer to begin by pointing out to the skeptic that certain concepts or thoughts are necessarily involved in the having of experience. Unfortunately, the natural, sensible focus is an unpromising one. Granted, the skeptic must accept the minimal assumption that he has experience and thus possesses the sorts of concepts and thinks the sorts of thoughts which the transcendental arguer has identified as necessary for having experience. But without some kind of verification principle, nothing interesting can be derived from this slender assumption. In order to get the desired anti-skeptical conclusion, a principle is needed to connect the possession of con-