Transcendental Arguments: Verification Or Parasitism?

Abstract

Recent discussions on the nature of arguments have raised the question of whether these arguments are in any way distinct or unique. Though commentators in general agree transcendental arguments are supposed to refute scepticism, no general agreement has been reached as to their distinctiveness. Barry Stroud, in his Arguments, argues transcendental arguments rely ultimately on some version of the verification principle, and . . there is nothing special or unique, and nothing new, about this way of attacking scepticism.i Several rejoinders to Stroud's attack on the uniqueness of the transcendental argument have been forthcoming. The most promising of these defenses of the integrity of the transcendental argument has been Rorty's Verificationism and Transcendental Arguments. Rorty argues the so-called transcendental arguments which Stroud examines are not examples of this sort of argument. Rorty contends that the only good 'transcendental* argument is a 'parasitism* argument.3 A parasitism argument is supposed to escape the Stroudian attack. According bo Rorty, Stroud's appraisal is effective against those versions of the transcendental argument which seek to necessary existence. The parasitism argument refutes the sceptic not by trying to prove objects must exist, but by demonstrating the sceptic's new way of describing the world in terms of experiences, say, is not possible without the use of material object concepts. In other words, the parasitism argument seeks to show the sceptic's alternative conceptual scheme is incapable of providing descriptions of everything vre now describe in terms of e.g. persons and objects . . . in terms of experiences.