Animal Dignity and the Law: Potential, Problems and Possible Implications

Abstract

This article aims to assess the suitability of the concept of ‘animal dignity’ as a normative principle for the legal approach towards animals. Through an analysis of the recent debate on the applicability, meaning(s) and implications of dignity to (non-human) animals, it will defend the argument that, despite its conceptual vagueness, the concept of ‘animal dignity’ has the potential to address some of the shortcomings in the current paradigm based in animal welfare, as well as in the often proposed paradigms based in ideas of animal rights. By taking a neo-pragmatic perspective (focusing on the use rather than the exact—but impossible to pinpoint—meaning of ‘animal dignity’), it seeks to demonstrate that traces of animal dignity can already be found in positive law, e.g. in the attention given to the intrinsic legal relevance of animals and their interests. It also argues that dignity does not need to be a monolithic concept applicable in the same way to all animals, but can be adapted to species-specific needs to flourish: dignity is therefore more of a sliding scale, depending on the breadth and width of the needs of each animal species. The article concludes that introducing ‘animal dignity’ as a normative principle in the legal realm might be a desirable step towards more-than-human legalities in the Anthropocene.