Abstract
This article leverages normative insights from the dyadic democratic peace literature to assess whether the configuration of regime types within an intelligence alliance can shape the depth of cooperation between its members. The Anglo-Soviet intelligence alliance (1941–45) is considered as an initial plausibility probe of this argument. Evidence is found to support the premise that cooperation between the intelligence services of a democracy and an autocracy is constrained by the absence of the democratic norms of bounded uncertainty and contingent consent. The article concludes with recommendations on how future scholarship can further explore the relationship between regime type and the depth of international intelligence cooperation.
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