Anglo-American Crude Diplomacy: Multinational Oil and the Iranian Oil Crisis, 1951–53

Abstract

The importance of non-state actors to western Cold War strategy and intergovernmental relations has not generally received the attention that it warrants. This article uses Iran's nationalisation of its oil industry in the early 1950s to demonstrate that analysing the role of non-state actors – in this case the oil majors – can provide further insights both into the policies adopted by the British and American governments toward the crisis and into consequent Anglo-American relations. Specifically it argues that the British and American governments found the oil majors to be indispensable in addressing the oil crisis and useful in managing their bilateral relationship. They also found, however, that the oil majors were able to de facto impose limits upon Anglo-American ‘crude diplomacy’ and that in doing so they on occasion changed the balance of Anglo-American exchanges.