Abstract
Taking the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 as samples, this paper finds that there is A “pressure-promoting” effect of analysts’ optimistic predictions on impression management of CSR information disclosure. Further research shows that, compared with the enterprises with better performance, the “pressure promotion” effect of analysts’ optimistic prediction is more significant for enterprises with poor performance. Compared with enterprises without third-party assurance, the third-party assurance enterprises are less affected by the “pressure promotion” effect predicted by analysts. Compared with mandatory disclosure of CSR reporting companies, companies that voluntarily disclose CSR reports are less affected by the “pressure promotion” effect predicted by analysts optimistic. After a series of robustness tests, the above conclusions are still valid.
Highlights
Impression management of CSR information disclosure mainly refers to the management's whitewash or cover up of CSR information disclosure, such as "reporting good news but not bad news", exaggerating or falsely reporting the performance of corporate social responsibility, so as to create a good image of the enterprise 1
In model (1), the total score of CSR is taken as the explained variable, and the relevant control variables are explained as follows, among which the enterprise size (Size), asset liability ratio (Lev), total asset net interest rate (ROA) and equity to market ratio (MTB) reflect the basic financial characteristics of enterprises; management shareholding ratio (Mhold), institutional shareholding ratio (Ihold) and executive compensation (Pay) reflect the level of corporate governance; place of incorporation (Place), listing location (List) and external audit (Big4) reflect the external environment of enterprises
The (4) column is the regression results of mandatory disclosure group, and the coefficients of OPT_F and CSR_e was significantly positive at the level of 1%. It shows that compared with the enterprises that voluntarily disclose CSR reports, the capital market and the regulatory authorities pay more attention to the enterprises that compulsively disclose CSR reports, which leads to greater pressure on them and makes them more likely to use the impression management of social responsibility disclosure as a tool to seek private interests
Summary
Impression management of CSR information disclosure mainly refers to the management's whitewash or cover up of CSR information disclosure, such as "reporting good news but not bad news", exaggerating or falsely reporting the performance of corporate social responsibility, so as to create a good image of the enterprise 1. Existing studies have confirmed that this kind of pressure will lead managers to myopia and induce managers' self-interested behavior, which is typically manifested as the enhancement of management's motivation for information manipulation 23. This gives rise to a realistic question worthy of consideration. This paper expands the research field of influencing factors of CSR information disclosure impression management, enriches the relevant research on analysts' optimistic prediction of economic consequences, and in practice, this paper has reference significance for improving the quality of corporate social responsibility information disclosure and investor protection, In addition, this paper provides experience reference for corporate social responsibility information regulatory agencies
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