Abstract

This paper examines the difference that the assurance brings to the quality of CSR reports in the Chinese institutional setting, in particular, the difference in quality (proxy – RKS ranking) of assured and unassured CSR reports, as well as whether the high ownership concentration and corresponding to it “entrenchment effect” obstruct the positive impact the assurance exerts on the quality of CSR reports. The paper examines CSR reports on 2,292 firm-year observations of large Chinese companies over three years (2015–2018). The hypothesis development process predicates on the signaling and stakeholder theories, whilst this study applies regression analysis to test the hypotheses. Consistent with the predictions of signaling and stakeholder theories, the paper finds that assurance contributes to the higher quality of CSR reports. Moreover, the study finds that assured CSR reports have higher sub-scores in all four aspects of RKS ranking. However, as ownership concentration exceeds 50 per cent and reaches the majority, it thwarts the advancement in the quality of CSR reports through its assurance. The paper provides an initial empirical account of the role of assurance in the emerging CSR reporting practice in China. The paper contributes to the modest body of empirical research on the function of external assurance in the CSR area by explicating the role played both by the accounting (external assurance) and corporate governance (ownership concentration) infrastructure to ensure high quality of CSR reporting. The paper briefs local, international regulatory authorities and the business community about the importance of external assurance for the CSR reporting quality.

Highlights

  • The results show that the total corporate social responsibility report (CSRR) score (Score) of companies that conduct corporate social responsibility assurance (CSRA) is significantly higher than that of companies that do not, and the significance level reaches 1%

  • The results verify the signaling theory as the result is interpreted in a way congruent with this paper demonstrates that external signaling theory: more qualified corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporters assurance on CSRR contributes to its higher qualmerely take advantage of external assurance as ity, the exact mechanism of how and why is not a quality signal, whilst poor quality reporting is ascertained yet

  • This paper aims to test the effect of the external assurance on the CSRR quality in China

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Summary

Introduction

Corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR) has considerably impacted business communication worldwide (Bollas-Araya et al, 2019; Maroun & Prinsloo, 2020), since a corporate social responsibility report (CSRR) has become the main vehicle organizations worldwide utilize to communicate their economic, social and environmental performance (Bollas-Araya et al, 2019; Braam & Peeters, 2018; Chi et al, 2020; Sharma, 2019), succumbing to the pressure placed on them by various stakeholders. The spread of CSRR is accompanied by concerns about the credibility of the information being provided to stakeholders (Ackers, 2017; Boiral, 2013; Boiral & Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2020; Channuntapipat et al, 2019; Milne et al, 2009; Tregidga et al, 2014). Just as this practice is consolidated, the need for credible information in this area is critical and palpable (Bollas-Araya et al, 2019). KPMG avers that “assurance of sustainability becomes a majority practice” (KPMG, 2020, p. 23) as 51 per cent (33 per cent in 2005) of N100 companies and 71 per cent of G250 companies (30 per cent in 2005) assured their sustainability reports (KPMG, 2020, p. 23)

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