Abstract
Research content: Based on the framework of Chinese-style promotion game, a theoretical model to describe how local government behavior and preference affect agglomeration is made up, and empirical evidence is provided based on the samples from 282 cities in China. Innovation: Taking industrial connections as the grasp of the hand, different effects of local government behavior and preference on the agglomeration of manufacturing industry and production service industry are identified, which provides a new perspective for the explanation of the causes of agglomeration economy in China. Main conclusions: (1) In the Chinese promotion game, local government officials will promote local manufacturing industry agglomeration and producer services industry agglomeration for the maximization of their promotion profits, but prefer to promote manufacturing industry agglomeration. (2) The connection between producer services industry and manufacturing industry, and the connection within manufacturing industries will affect local governments’ industry selection preference, the former can induce local governments to tend to pull up the agglomeration of producer services industry, the latter can induce local governments to tend to pull up the manufacturing industry agglomeration.
Highlights
Industrial agglomeration has been one of the hot spots of academic research in recent years
From sub-results in (17) and (18), we have propositions below: Proposition 1: In the Chinese promotion game, local government officials will promote the agglomeration of local manufacturing industry and the agglomeration of productive services in order to maximize the probability of their promotion
Proposition 3: The higher the connection among different industries within manufacturing industry, the stronger the pulling effect of manufacturing industry on local economy, local government officials will be more willing to pull up the level of local manufacturing industry agglomeration and reduce the level of productive service industry agglomeration relatively
Summary
Industrial agglomeration has been one of the hot spots of academic research in recent years. Zong and Zhu (2013) [18] make a empirical analysis using provincial panel data of China based on the theoretical framework of Commendatore et al (2008) [9], and find out that productive public expenditure has a positive impact on industrial agglomeration on the provincial level in China. Li et al (2017) [19] uses provincial panel data of China and analyze empirically whether the differences of local government policy and behavior will affect the regional industrial agglomeration, and find out that industrial policy, public service policy and open-up policy have a positive impact on industrial agglomeration, while fiscal policy has a significant negative impact. This paper tries to provide an interpretation framework for industrial agglomeration from the perspective of local government behavior and preference, in order to enrich the existing theoretical system of industrial agglomeration interpretation and provide a new perspective for the explanation of the causes of industrial agglomeration in China
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