Abstract
Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.
Highlights
Poverty is a permanent problem in human history
This study explores the effect of different supervision modes and parameters design. e results indicate that the industry poverty alleviation project does not continue without government supervision, no matter how high the initial willingness of enterprises and poor farmers to participate in the project is. erefore, government supervision is indispensable to implement the poverty alleviation project. e obtained results are helpful for the government to develop an appropriate policy for the industry poverty alleviation
The initial probability y of active participation for poor farmers is divided into these situations
Summary
Poverty is a permanent problem in human history. China, the largest developing country in the world, has a severe poverty problem. E main participants in industry poverty alleviation are enterprises and poor farmers, constructing the long-term benefit connection mechanism. Liang et al analyze the function mechanism and constraints of local governments, poverty alleviation enterprises, and poor farmers in improving industry poverty alleviation based on the sustainable livelihood analysis framework [5]. E influence mechanism of market uncertainty and participation in industrialization projects to poverty reduction is discussed in [6]. Is study uses evolutionary game theory to investigate the game process between enterprises and poor farmers in industry poverty alleviation. Based on the proposed model, the behavioral processes between enterprises and poor farmers in industry poverty alleviation are analyzed by simulation. E results indicate that the industry poverty alleviation project does not continue without government supervision, no matter how high the initial willingness of enterprises and poor farmers to participate in the project is. This study explores the effect of different supervision modes and parameters design. e results indicate that the industry poverty alleviation project does not continue without government supervision, no matter how high the initial willingness of enterprises and poor farmers to participate in the project is. erefore, government supervision is indispensable to implement the poverty alleviation project. e obtained results are helpful for the government to develop an appropriate policy for the industry poverty alleviation
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