Analysis of nuclear proliferation resistance

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All the civil nuclear energy systems could contribute to the proliferation risk that weapons-usable material might be diverted or misused for the weapons purpose by terrorists or states. Proliferation-resistant nuclear energy systems are of great importance for the peaceful use of nuclear energy by impeding the diversion or undeclared production of weapons-usable material by states. Since the National Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) carried out the assessment of proliferation resistance of the civil nuclear energy systems in late 1970s, several comprehensive studies have been performed, including the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Spent Fuel Standard by the United States National Academy of Science, the Technical Opportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS) by the United States Department of Energy, the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) Methodology by the IAEA, and the Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems (Gen IV) by the Gen IV International Forum. However, all these studies appear lack in the interpretation of country-specific proliferation risk that is arbitrary imposed to the specific countries by major nuclear weapons states, even though the countries are members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This paper outlines the assessments of proliferation resistance of the above studies, points out the country-specific proliferation risk, and suggests further studies to increase the proliferation resistance of the civil nuclear energy systems in the specific NPT member countries such as South Korea.