Abstract

To protect RFID systems against the relay attack, distance bounding protocols are proposed based upon the round trip time measurements of the executed messages. With such protocols, in addition to tags' authentication, the reader estimates an upper bound for the physical distance between the tag and itself. Recently, Kim and Avoine proposed two distance bounding protocols called KA1 and KA2 both utilize mixed random and predefined challenges. It is well-known that KA2 can provide a good performance in view of mafia fraud resistance and system memory requirements for the tags. Since RFID systems and distance bounding protocols are particularly susceptible to noise, in this paper, KA1 and KA2 are analyzed to compute the rejection probability of a valid tag due to channel errors. In this case, the analysis as well as simulation results shows that increasing the number of rounds (iterations) with predefined challenges causes the rejection probability of a valid tag to increase.

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