Abstract

Distance bounding protocols are launched based upon the round trip time measurements of the carried out messages to defend RFID systems against the relay attack. In such protocols, the reader authenticates tags and also estimates an upper bound for the physical distance between the tag and itself. Distance bounding protocols are vulnerable to mafia fraud and distance fraud attacks. In this paper, a new distance bounding protocol is proposed based on mutual utilization of binary predefined and random challenges. Moreover, this protocol is analyzed to compute the attacker's success probability due to mafia fraud and distance fraud attacks. In this case, the analysis and simulation results show that the proposed protocol obtains the desirable attackers' success probabilities, with minimum system memory requirement and minimum number of rounds compared with other distance bounding protocols employed by RFID systems.

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