Abstract
Establishing a rational pricing mechanism for electric vehicles (EVs) can incentivize users to engage in charging activities, foster positive consumption behaviors, and indirectly benefit the grid by increasing load demand. Therefore, this paper conducts a Stackelberg game study between the grid and EV users by utilizing real charging and discharging data of EV users in F city. First, the price elasticity of EV users' electricity consumption behavior is analyzed. Second, the Stackelberg game model is constructed, multiple tariff schemes are designed to calculate the equilibrium tariff of the game, and the benefits of the grid and EV users are analyzed in comparison with the tariff policy that will be implemented in F city. Lastly, different seasonal scenarios are constructed to extend the applicability of the research results. It is found that Scheme 3 effectively incentivizes charging load growth, increases cross-subsidies and transmission and distribution fees, and protects the level of charging and discharging costs for residents; furthermore, lowering charging and discharging tariffs during seasons of high price elasticity for residents to increase demand is an optimal strategy for grid pricing.
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