Analysis of budgetary decision-making in a Federal Institute of Education

Abstract

This article examines the organizational model of decision-making on discretionary spending and its perceptions in a Federal Institute of Education, describing dysfunctionalities resulting from it. The research uses a secondary data analysis of budget execution, norms, minutes and other decision-making sources, as well as perceptions collected at different levels of management through a survey. Dysfunctions were identified through quantitative indicators, and predictive variables were raised through regression. Perceptions about the expenditure management model were reduced to two constructs through factor analysis: budgetary appropriatons protection and generalized apathy. These perceptions about spending management are in line with a political decision-making model characterized by anomalies and contractual failures, which manifest themselves in budgetary dysfunctions, such as rushed spending at the end of the year and excessive flexibility of expenses. Aspects of the prevailing political decision-making model result in unrealized action plans, hasty spending at the end of the fiscal year, and disproportionate use of flexibility in budget execution. The research contributed to the understanding and improvement of the internal decision-making process in bodies endowed with budgetary autonomy.