Analysing the Core Executive

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Traditionally, analysis of central government has been dominated by the ‘Westminster model’. This chapter will describe this model, outline its problems and propose an alternative framework for analysing the core executive. Through the lens of the Westminster model, Britain is generally perceived as having a hierarchical and unified political system, with power concentrated in the central institutions of the state. This view of the political system has influenced both politicians and political scientists examining British politics. In this chapter I will argue that such a perspective offered a partial reflection of the British political system, but was oversimplified as a form of analysis because of its crude definition of power. Consequently, I will examine a number of more sophisticated analytical frameworks that pay attention to the value systems of government, informal institutions, policy networks and resource dependency. Finally, I will outline the framework that will be used to examine the core executive in this book. I will demonstrate that the core executive is not based on command, but on resource exchange and dependency. Therefore, to understand the core executive, it is important to trace the structures of dependency that link the actors and institutions of the central state. I will suggest that the nature of such links can be understood only in the context of structure, tactics and the prevailing political circumstances.